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I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. 
Yes, if I did not, had I not done that, we wouldn't be here today. 
And I say without the slightest remorse, that we wouldn't be here, 
we would not have made economic progress, if we had not 
intervened on very personal matters - who your neighbour is, 
how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language 
you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people 
think. 
 





The First Law of Singapore Politics: The government abhors a 
political vacuum. It wants to fill every space and control every 
agenda. 
The Second Law of Singapore Politics: Every action by citizens 
invites an unequal and opposite reaction by government.  
 
 Cherian George (2000) 
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This dissertation aims to investigate and analyse the strategies of control 
employed by the Leviathan in Singapore. It thus asks two broad research 
questions. Firstly, how does one explain and conceptualize the seemingly 
inconsistent, hybrid nature of the state’s strategy towards political control which 
often seems contradictory and paradoxical? Secondly, it asks how one can 
explicate the state’s approach towards the protest movements that have 
mushroomed and become more commonplace in Singapore since 2011? 
The aim of this research is to show that explanations in the literature are 
insufficient in helping us understand the shifting and expanding approaches 
towards political control that the state in Singapore is adopting. While the 
literature has correctly articulated that there exists a ‘calibrated’ approach to 
coercion and co-optation as primary strategies of control, any attempt to 
understand the politics of control in Singapore is incomplete without 
understanding how the state calibrates liberalization as a third primary strategy 
of control.  
This dissertation contends that a more nuanced and comprehensive 
understanding of the Leviathan’s hegemony must include an understanding of 
its spectrum of approaches towards political control, which this study terms the 
spectrum of control. I argue that using such a framework allows us to understand 
the varied and calibrated nature of PAP’s approach. I also add to the spectrum 
by offering a new theory of calibrated liberalization which I contend is used in 
tandem with other approaches of coercion and co-optation.  
Using the case studies of three protest movements, namely the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) protests in 2014, the National Library Board (NLB) saga in 2014, 
and the furore over the Thaipusam Festival in 2015, this comparative study thus 
focuses on theory development, using detailed case studies to examine the shift 
in government strategies of control.  
This study is important because it contributes to the understanding that hybrid 
regimes with authoritarian features can expand their strategies of control, 
particularly by liberalizing in a calibrated and nuanced fashion. It offers a new 
framework to understand how strategies are calibrated to deal with new 
challenges and plugs the current gap in literature that fails to perceive 
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This dissertation is a contribution to the literature on the politics of control in 
authoritarian regimes. It aims to study the state’s strategies of control towards 
protest movements in the case of Singapore. In particular, it aims to offer a 
better understanding of how these strategies of control have evolved in 
Singapore in the period since 2011 in particular, when a landmark election 
forced the government into a period of introspection about the state of politics 
and governance in Singapore. 
 In a landmark speech in 1991, then-Minister George Yeo articulated the 
deficiencies of a highly pervasive state and the need for greater space for non-
government participation in nation building: 
The problem now is that under the banyan tree very little else 
can grow. When state institutions are too pervasive, civic 
institutions cannot thrive. It's necessary to prune the banyan trees 
so other plants can grow…we cannot do without the banyan tree. 
Singapore will always need a strong centre…we need some 
pluralism but not too much because too much will also destroy 
us. In other words, we prune judiciously.1  
The notion of a banyan tree being pruned by a ‘liberalising state’ has been a 
mainstay in discussions on Singapore politics since the late 1980s, as the state 
transitioned from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong as Prime Minister, who 
made similar declarations of a liberalising People’s Action Party (PAP) regime. 
However, Rodan (2009) noted that any attempt at liberalising under Goh 
                                                 
1 George Yeo, “Civic Society- Between the Family and the State” (speech, NUSS Society 
Inaugural Lecture in Singapore, June 20, 1991). 
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“generally involved expanding the political space of the state rather than any 
greater toleration of independent, collective organisations engaged in political 
competition with or mobilisation against, the PAP.”2  
George Yeo’s landmark speech on the pruning of the banyan tree came 
just four years after Operation Spectrum, where alleged Marxists were detained 
without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA).3 It was this era that saw the 
development of Out of Bounds (OB) markers for regulating public discussion 
and the shift towards using defamation suits to stifle political opposition. The 
rhetoric of liberalisation and the expansion of civic space in the 1990s through 
grassroots organisations was accompanied in reality by a constant expansion of 
the state.  
In the 2000s, the rhetoric remained much the same. Upon taking office 
in 2004, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong declared that “in his vision Singapore 
would thrive on public participation and debate, diverse views, unconventional 
thinking, innovative strategies, a spirit of adventure and a forward-looking 
orientation.”4  Kenneth Paul Tan (2007) argues that in fact, the “old politics that 
has tightly controlled the possibilities and limitations of civil society in the 
1980s and 1990s (has) continue(d) to hold back any real transformation of 
Singapore.”5  
Tan further contends that any attempt at a ‘new politics’ would be “little 
more than a matter of resource management to produce a more complicated 
                                                 
2Garry Rodan, “Goh’s Consensus Politics of Authoritarian Rule,” in Impressions of the Goh 
Chok Tong Years in Singapore, ed by Bridget Welsh et al (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009):61. 
3 Michael D. Barr, “Marxists in Singapore?,” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (2010): 335 – 362. 
4 Kenneth Paul Tan, “New Politics for a renaissance city.” in Renaissance Singapore? 




political legitimacy” based on more complicated and nuanced levers of power.6 
In his view, liberalisation in the Singapore context has traditionally been more 
gestural than anything else, with the state present even in exercises of 
‘liberalisation’.7 Cherian George (2000), who shares this perspective, proposes 
that the “First Law of Singapore Politics” is that “the government abhors a 
political vacuum. It wants to fill every space and control every agenda.”8 
Following the 2011 General Election, there was again a heightened 
sense of optimism about the prospects for liberalisation and greater freedom in 
political discourse in Singapore. Observers predicted there would now be a 
definitive “transitioning to a new normal” which would herald a more liberal 
and open form of politics in Singapore.9 The PAP’s vote share of 60.5% was its 
lowest since independence and it had also managed to lose a Group 
Representation Constituency (GRC), “long thought to be an impossible feat.”10  
This idea also gained traction following the release of the Population 
White Paper on 29 January 2013. The paper triggered a national furore over its 
contents, with a disillusioned and angry populace voicing its discontent through 
every available medium, both mainstream and alternative media. The level of 
discontent shocked most political observers and pundits.”11 Far more shocking 
however was that on February 16 2013, a crowd of approximately “4,000 people 
                                                 
6 Tan, “New Politics”, 35. 
7 Terence Lee, “Gestural Politics: Civil Society in “New” Singapore,” Journal of Social Issues in 
Southeast Asia 20:2 (2005) 
8 Cherian George, Singapore: The Air-conditioned Nation: Essays on the Politics of Comfort 
and Control, 1990-2000. (Singapore: Landmark Books 2000):127. 
9 Eugene K.B Tan. "Singapore: Transitioning to a" New Normal" in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew 
Era." Southeast Asian Affairs 2012, no. 1 (2012): 265-282. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Teo Chee Hean, “The Closing Speech” (speech, The Parliamentary Debate on the 
Population White Paper in Singapore, February 8, 2013). 
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gathered at the Speakers' Corner at Hong Lim Park on Saturday afternoon to 
protest against the Population White Paper endorsed by Parliament.”12 This was 
the first organised mass protest in Singapore in decades, and a spectacle many 
younger Singaporeans had not experienced.  
The state did not respond to the White paper protests with coercion, nor 
did it attempt to openly stifle conversation and mobilisation online. In fact, the 
presence of the state in the public sphere as a controlling and moderating force 
was notably absent. In the two years since the White paper protests, Singapore 
has seen a mushrooming of protest movements. The number of events registered 
at Hong Lim Park in 2103, Singapore’s lawfully sanctioned outdoor venue for 
protests without permits, nearly doubled from 2011, rising from 85 to 169.13  
The state’s response to different protest movements has varied, with 
some (like the White Paper protests) drawing government engagement and 
space for public discussion while others have drawn more coercive responses 
involving suppression of online discussions, defamation suits, and prohibitions 
on protest rallies.  
1.1 Research Questions and Significance of Study 
This thesis asks two broad research questions. Firstly, how can we explain and 
conceptualize the seemingly inconsistent, hybrid nature of the state’s strategy 
towards political control which often seems contradictory and paradoxical? 
                                                 
12 “Parliament endorses population White Paper by 77 votes to 13,” The Straits Times, 
February 8, 2013,http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/parliament-endorses-population-
white-paper-by-a-vote-of-77-to-13. 





Secondly, it asks how we can explicate the PAP regime’s approach towards the 
protest movements that have mushroomed and become more commonplace in 
Singapore since 2011.  
The literature on state control in Singapore has increasingly portrayed 
the state’s strategy as highly nuanced and carefully calibrated. But the concept 
of ‘calibration’ itself has had little attention. I attempt to articulate exactly what 
is meant by talk of ‘calibrated’ policies and offer a new theoretical framework 
to understand the range of policy options available to authoritarian regimes to 
remain stable and maintain control and hegemony. In particular, I focus on the 
PAP’s approach towards the protest movements that have mushroomed in 
Singapore’s socio-political arena. I address the changing problems faced by the 
PAP government in maintaining hegemony and explain the need for a wider 
spectrum of calibrated policies, including those that focus on liberalisation.  
This dissertation focuses on the protest movements that have become 
more commonplace in Singapore since 2011. The movements would warrant 
study if only because there is a dearth of academic analysis of them. However, 
from a theoretical perspective, the protest movements are important because 
they allow us to understand the PAP as a hegemonic regime that is able to 
adroitly respond to new challenges, even those that constrain and limit its ability 
to function unilaterally.  
Picking three different protest movements that attracted public attention 
and varied responses from the state, the dissertation complements a statist 
approach with a bottom-up approach. It makes use of interviews to understand 
the perceptions of the participants in the protest movements towards the 
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Singapore state while comparing their accounts to the state’s own justifications 
for its handling of the issues.  
This paper argues that a more nuanced and comprehensive 
understanding of the PAP regime’s control and hegemony means understanding 
its use of a spectrum of approaches towards hegemony, the spectrum of control. 
Using the concepts of calibrated coercion as articulated by George (2005) and 
calibrated secularism as articulated by Abdullah (2012), as well as the work of 
other scholars, this dissertation identifies the different gradations on this 
spectrum of control, while highlighting that the different approaches that these 
gradations represent are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they can be combined 
in multiple variations as befits the state.   
The concept of the spectrum of control goes beyond the existing 
literature. Calibrated coercion explains state approaches towards civil society 
groups and the press.14 Calibrated secularism explains the state’s approach 
towards religious organisations such as the Islamic Scholars and Religious 
Teachers Association (Pergas).15 Both approaches however are insufficient in 
explaining the state’s approach towards the protest movements that have 
flourished since 2011. This requires an appreciation of the strategy of calibrated 
liberalisation, an essential strategy in the spectrum of control. Using the case 
studies of three protest movements, namely the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
protests in 2014, the National Library Board (NLB) saga in 2014, and the furore 
                                                 
14
 Cherian George, “Calibrated Coercion and the Maintenance of Hegemony in Singapore.” 
Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 48 (2005). 
15 Walid Jumblatt Abdullah “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study of 




over the Hindu Thaipusam Festival in 2015, this dissertation argues that the 
strategy of calibrated liberalisation and its position on the spectrum of control 
is essential to understanding the Singapore government’s approach towards 
negotiating and maintaining hegemony. 
1.2 Methodology  
In studying the diverse strategies employed by the state to maintain hegemony, 
and placing them on the spectrum of control, this dissertation will employ three 
broad strategies. Firstly it will explore the linkages and structures that exist 
between the state and the various groups or organisations concerned.  
Secondly, it presents original research on the statements, actions, and 
failures to act of those involved in the three protest movements during the 
protest movements as well as those of state officials. Given that an 
overwhelming amount of the mobilization and discussion took place on online 
social networking sites, particularly Facebook, the groundswell is relatively 
easy to document.  
Lastly, it makes use of interviews with organisers and participants in the 
protest movements as well as with other civil society activists. These interviews 
are important records of the impressions and opinions of organisers and 
participants that can help us understand the protest movements as well how the 
participants perceived the intentions and actions of the state. Interviews with 
other seasoned civil society activists also help us to establish an understanding 
of other strategies employed by the state, and how activists who have 
traditionally been involved with civil society see the government’s strategy to 
deal with this new challenge.  
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The process of establishing the theoretical framework has been carried 
out on the basis of an extensive analysis of the existing literature, which has 
focused on policies of coercion and co-optation. To anticipate the findings in a 
preliminary way, there is a dearth of work on the recent protest movements, 
including those that have been selected as case studies for this dissertation.  
To correct this shortcoming, interviews were conducted with organizers 
and participants in the protest movements. Interviews were also conducted with 
seasoned civil society activists to gain an informed outsiders perspective on the 
protest movements as well as the actions of the state. Official interviews and 
statements by state officials and politicians will also be analysed to understand 
their perceptions and attitudes. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 undertakes a comprehensive literature review of the various strategies 
employed by the PAP regime. Inherent limitations and gaps in the existing work 
will be pointed out, while earlier research that in many ways foreshadowed the 
need to establish my more comprehensive framework will be acknowledged. 
Chapter 3 will then build an alternative and complementary theory of calibrated 
liberalisation. The chapter also lays the foundations of the concept of a spectrum 
of control.  
Chapter 4 will explore the case study of the NLB saga in 2014. The brief 
history of the saga, the actions and statements of the protestors and government 
officials will be dealt with. The chapter will then attempt to understand state 
action within the framework of the spectrum of control, with particular focus on 
the strategy of calibrated liberalisation. Chapter 5 will undertake the same 
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efforts with the CPF protests in 2014, while Chapter 6 will tackle the furore over 
the Thaipusam festival in 2014. The conclusion will underscore the key 
contributions and ideas propagated in the dissertation, propose further avenues 






















2.1 Overview of Chapter 
There has been much research explaining the PAP regime’s political control in 
Singapore as well as the various means and strategies of control employed by 
the regime. This section examines some of the most influential and critical 
works, and identifies key themes in the current literature on state control in 
Singapore. It begins with an inquest on how scholars have come to understand 
the notion of political control in Singapore, following which it examines the 
dual strategies of coercion and co-optation. Lastly, it examines the academic 
literature on liberalisation in Singapore, noting its cynical slant and the paucity 
of research on the use of liberalisation as a strategy of control. 
2.2 The Basis of Political Control in Singapore  
The defining feature of the PAP regime has been extensive political and social 
‘control’. Mauzy and Milne (2002) note that “control” is the only acceptable 
term that could be applied to the Singapore state and stress “the state’s 
persistence in attempting to penetrate many aspects of social life.”16 Rodan 
(1993) articulates this as the “general pervasiveness of the state in the social 
sphere.”17 It is in this pervasiveness that Mauzy and Milne find great 
ambiguity.18 Indeed, the greatest stumbling block in defining the politics of 
Singapore, is the difficulty of distinguishing between the party, government and 
                                                 
16 Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, “Singapore politics under the people's action party,” 
London: Routledge (2002): 35. 
17 Garry Rodan, "Preserving the One-party State in Contemporary Singapore," in Southeast 
Asia in the Nineties: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, ed Kevin Hewison et al 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993): 82. 
18 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore politics, 35. 
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state and even further, between the bureaucracy, and para-political 
organisations such as the People’s Association, Town Councils and ethnic self-
help groups such as SINDA, MENDAKI and CDAC. Perceived ambiguities 
however should not be seen as a limitation in studying political and social 
control in Singapore. Rather it is a useful starting point in understanding the 
scope and extent of control the regime has at its disposal.  
Chan Heng Chee’s (1975) illustration of Singapore as an “administrative 
state” is useful in understanding the PAP regime in terms of its capacity and the 
extent of its political control. Chan noted as early as 1975 that “depoliticisation 
of a politically active and aggressive” citizenship had become “a conscious 
explicit philosophy” and that the administrative functions of the bureaucracy 
had evolved into the real locus of politics in Singapore.19 Highlighting that the 
PAP had actively repressed opposition parties such as the Barisan Socialis 
“through the application of the whole range of political weaponry” while 
saturating “electoral constituencies with community centres and…Citizens 
Consultative Committees (CCC),” Chan argued that the regime had effectively 
stymied all political activity other than those of the regime.20 The “systemic 
depoliticisation and the de-emphasis on competitive politics”21, according to 
Chan had resulted in the development of an administrative state which would 
result in: a system of rule in which the bureaucracy, focused on efficiency and 
the provision of services would become increasingly powerful and influential; 
                                                 
19 Chan Heng Chee, Politics in an Administrative state: Where has the politics gone? 
Occasional Paper 11. (Singapore: Dept. of Political Science, University of Singapore) (1975): 
1-5.See also: Milton J. Esman, Administration and development in Malaysia: Institution 





the increase in importance of the technocrat who can effectively and efficiently 
operate within an administration; and governance that is focused towards 
limiting and carefully regulating political participation; scorning the need for 
public consensus and putting faith in the ability and expertise of a technocratic 
leadership to strategize and legislate with irreversible and absolute power. 22 
Chan, therefore, notes that in the Singapore model, the party, especially 
the cabinet, retains firm control of the reins of power. She contends that “the 
politicization in the public arena is to a great extent mirrored within the party 
arena” where the “leadership has firm control over rank and file” and the 
“unseemly rambunctious scramble for power is absent and party discipline is 
strictly observed,” resulting in “amazing elite cohesion”.23  
Chan’s analysis of Singapore as an administrative state should be seen 
more as a reflection of elite cohesion and control of state apparatus than a shift 
of power from the PAP party towards the bureaucracy. Natasha Hamilton-Hart 
(2000) offers a sophisticated re-engineering of Chan’s earlier work by 
contending that political power and control in Singapore is wielded by a 
cohesive coalition of governing elite “encompassing bureaucratic, political and 
business actors” with many within the elite wearing multiple hats that stretch 
across all three sectors.24 Hamilton-Hart notes that while the bureaucracy is 
highly influential, it has remained entirely subordinate to the political 
leadership.25 The movement of bureaucrats into powerful roles within the public 
                                                 
22 Chan, Politics in an Administrative state, 4-5. 
23 Ibid., 13-15. 
24 Natasha Hamilton-Hart,” The Singapore state revisited” The Pacific Review 13, no. 2 
(2000):199.   
25 Ibid., 198. 
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and private sectors as well as into political positions in parliament and cabinet, 
according to Hamilton-Hart, signals that “real power is wielded by the 
ministers” and that the governing elite in Singapore possess an unparalleled 
dominance over state apparatus.26 The power structure and the ability to exert 
control is “essentially monolithic” and “heavily concentrated” in the hands of a 
governing elite that “continues to be able to “co-opt, contain or suppress most 
challenges”.27  
Other academics studying political power in Singapore have come to 
similar conclusions. Case (2001) articulates that Singapore’s elite, made up 
principally of top position holders in the PAP and the bureaucracy, has never 
been less than tightly cohesive since the late 1960s.28 Khong (1995) notes that 
instead of striking deals and accommodating leaders and elites already present 
in Singapore, the leadership of the PAP co-opted various elites into its system 
and vision, creating a “governing coalition” where “the political regime may 
well be regarded as oligarchic, as decision making is effectively confined to the 
political leadership.”29 Embedded within this oligarchy were the top echelons 
of the civil service which merged with the political leadership, which crucially 
linked elite cohesion, control of state apparatus and its role in conferring 
legitimacy through the provision of economic growth and the effective 
provision of public goods and its constant refinement and improvements.30  
                                                 
26 Hamilton-Hart,” The Singapore state revisited”, 199.   
27 Ibid., 202. 
28 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or less. Richmond, (Surrey: Curzon, 
2002):86-87. 
29 Khong Cho-Oon. "Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Managing Conformity." in 
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah 
Alagappa, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995):116-117. 
30 Ibid., 132-135. 
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Leong (2010) offers a conclusive review of the arguments we have discussed 
thus far by contending that:  
The Singapore political system has been transformed into a 
centralised structure characterised by the overlapping of 
party/government/state institutions. They are interrelated in 
astonishingly vast areas, with one helping the others to grow, 
resulting in the shoring and entrenchment of power. The PAP 
(the party) which forms the government has acquired 
governmental and non-governmental organs (the state) to 
achieve continuous political dominance. The Singapore state in 
essence is represented by a diverse range of institutions…The 
widespread co-optation of elites into the government and 
state…has resulted in a symbiotic and collaborative relationship 
between the state apparatus and the government.31  
The key literature on political control in Singapore has illustrated that 
the regime has effectively established a symbiotic relationship between state, 
government and party. How then does one refer to the monolithic PAP regime? 
A useful conceptualisation is offered by Dan Slater’s (2010) concept of 
authoritarian Leviathans, defined as “regimes that seek to use the full force of 
the state apparatus to subjugate society into a hierarchical, command centered 
body politic on a presumptively permanent basis” which seems perfectly 
tailored for the PAP regime in Singapore, given the arguments we have 
observed above.32 Slater articulates that the “power of the Singapore state to 
regulate and control social life is…legendary”33 and notes that Singapore is “the 
                                                 
31 Ho Khai Leong. “Political Consolidation in Singapore: Connecting the Party, the 
Government and the Expanding State.” In Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, 
edited by Terence Chong (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010):76. 
32 Dan Slater, Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast 




strongest authoritarian leviathan in Southeast Asia.”34 Slater argues that the 
Singapore Leviathan was forged by an elite collective coalition brought together 
by a ‘protection pact’ forged by the ‘contentious politics’ of pre-independence 
era, driven by anxieties of communist insurgency and the racial and religious 
conflicts of merger and separation from Malaysia.35 He further contends that 
even after these threats had subsided, these elites created strong ruling parties, 
state and security apparatus and institutions that continue to strengthen their 
coalition and the Leviathan.36    
The basis of political control in Singapore, therefore, lies within the 
nexus of elite cohesion, which has allowed for the creation of an authoritarian 
Leviathan with a depoliticized administrative, technocratic structure and a 
monolithic power structure which has effectively established a symbiotic 
relationship between state, government and party.  
2.3 Theories and Trends in the study of Political Control in Singapore 
There are a few defining characteristics that stand out from the literature on 
state-society relations and political control in Singapore. Firstly, there is an 
acknowledgement that the PAP regime’s strategies of control are evolutionary 
in nature, constantly changing with the times, and expanding in capacity. 
Secondly, there is a keen focus on coercion and co-optation as key strategies of 
political control. Rodan (2006) notes that strategies of regime reproduction and 
political control in Singapore “are two-pronged: shoring up the systematic 
                                                 
34 Slater, Ordering power, 229. 
35 Ibid., 229-249. 
36 I will revisit Slater’s Leviathan in greater depth in the following chapter. For now it suffices 
to understand that his concept of the Leviathan, inspired by Hobbes, much like the mythical 
monster, is one of great strength and capacity, functioning as a monolith.  
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obstruction of genuine political competition; and where possible, co-opting new 
social forces to PAP-controlled institution and values.”37 This approach, as we 
shall observe in greater depth later, seems to be a defining means of 
understanding Singapore’s strategies of control. Thirdly, there is great emphasis 
on the notion of a sophisticated, refined and calibrated means of control. This 
seems very much in step with the perception of an administrative and 
technocratic elite ruling with scientific precision.38 Barr (2010) argues that 
“Singapore’s ruling elite runs a finely calibrated system of social and political 
control based on a mixture of monitoring and repression by the state, and self-
monitoring and self-restraint by all elements of civil society.”39 The perspective 
of political control is thus imbued with notions of “moderation” and “tempered 
by the fact that coercive measures used are not excessive.”40 The state constantly 
evolves in its approach towards control, retaining a wide range of tools of 
repression and co-optation, constantly expanding, calibrating and refining the 
manner and means through which these tools are used.  
2.4 Evolution and Expansion in the Strategies of Coercive Political Control 
in Singapore 
Mauzy and Milne (2002) in their survey of authoritarian aspects of PAP rule 
highlight that while the PAP possess draconian laws such as the Internal 
Security Act (ISA), which allows for the arrest and detention of persons without 
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trial, there has been since the 1980s, a shift away from using the ISA as a means 
of silencing political dissent.41 Instead the PAP has resorted to using legal 
proceedings to silence, particularly defamation suits.42 Such an approach is 
possible largely because “the constitutional right to free speech in Singapore is 
limited by the exception of defamation law, including the use of innuendo” 
which has allowed for the use of defamation suits on opposition politicians such 
as J.B Jayaretnam and Tang Liang Hong. George (2007) in similar fashion, 
notes that there has been a shift from more spectacular punishments such as 
imprisonment towards more behind-the-scene controls” with “economic 
sanctions favoured over those that violate the sanctity of the individual,” 
particularly through the threat of libel suits.43  
There have, however, been works that have focused on the use of hard 
coercion in Singapore. Barr (2010) for example offers an in-depth study of 
Operation Spectrum which led to the arrest and detainment without trial of 22 
activists, many of whom were social workers associated with the Roman 
Catholic Church in Singapore.44 Barr’s main point of contention is that “there 
is no room to doubt that this was a personal campaign, micromanaged” by Lee 
Kuan Yew, who was determined to “establish a firm pattern of effective 
authoritarian rule” in the twilight of his political career as he was planning to 
hand over the position of Prime Minister. Although Barr contends that Lee 
wanted to entrench a system of control that would confirm the 
compartmentalisation of politics through the threat of repression, the evidence 
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he offers points towards a more calibrated system of control. While the arrests 
were the most obvious form of control, the government quickly followed 
through with an equally firm legislative response through the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act (1990) which essentially criminalised the politicization 
of any religious organisation or group, under the auspices of guaranteeing 
religious harmony.45 Barr further argues that the use of the ISA on the activists 
as well as the passing of the Religious Harmony Act had a further effect of 
effecting “a new pattern whereby the Church supervised its own repression,” 
essentially putting in place a culture of self-censorship that permeated into 
greater civil society as well. The interplay between hard coercive measures like 
the ISA, the use of laws to socialise acquiescence as well as entrenching a 
culture of self-censorship must be seen as evidence of the Singapore Leviathan’s 
willingness even in the use of hard coercive measures to employ a calibrated 
strategy of control that would maximise effectiveness.  
 Rajah (2010) offers a comprehensive study of the use of legislation and 
other legal apparatus in maximising political control, and entrenching the 
indomitable position of the Leviathan in Singapore. Rajah argues that the use of 
broad, wide ranging laws offer an extension of the state’s capacity to expand 
control by concealing their “rule by law’ nature by masquerading within the 
official discourse and politically legitimized sphere of a ‘rule of law’.46 Rajah 
thus contends that the state’s use of legislative instruments to ensure political 
and social control is one in which ‘overt rule by law’ apparatus (ISA, 
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defamation proceedings) are used with an ever expanding means of ‘covert rule 
by law’ instruments, disguised as a legitimized discourse of a ‘rule of law’.47 
Inherently repressive laws thus function as legitimate and necessary, a 
calibrated and “strategic rescripting of the rule of law into rule by law” while 
sustaining state legitimacy” and expanding state means of control.48 
Perhaps the most sophisticated theoretical analysis of coercion and its 
calibrated nature in Singapore is Cherian George’s (2006, 2007 and 2012) 
theory of Calibrated Coercion.49  George focuses his notion of calibrated 
coercion on two basic notions; firstly, a constant expansion of the means of 
control and secondly the active use of self-restraint in terms of using these tools 
for the purpose of maximising the effectiveness of control at minimum political 
cost.50 Focusing on the coercion of the press in the first decade of independence, 
George notes that Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP quickly realised, following the 
use of hard coercive measures in 1971, that such ‘victories’ were extremely 
costly to the political legitimacy of the regime and should be avoided whenever 
possible. The PAP thus began to buttress its means of control with laws such as 
the NPPA, which gave it a greater range of more subtle controls against the local 
and foreign press. These measures included the use of sanctions and fines thus 
closely linking profitability with the notion of compliance, effectively creating 
a climate of self-censorship driven by the desire to maximise profit as much as 
the fear of censorship. George, however, notes that while the PAP consciously 
practices self-restraint, it does so without ever surrendering its most repressive 
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tools like the ISA, left to function as an “omnipresent Sword of Damocles.”51 
The theory is thus one of expansion, in which the state constantly looks to 
expand and evolve its means of control while actively refining and sharpening 
its use.  
George argues that the use of calibrated coercion in only effective if 
certain conditions are met. Firstly, the regime must have the confidence and 
interest in a long term future in power. If short term power consolidation is of 
primary concern, then the incentive to restrain the use of coercive power would 
be in short supply.52 Secondly, calibrated coercion is only possible “after access 
to the political arena was restricted to a limited number of players” and after a 
“period of repression” in which potentially contentious groups were 
“rationalised and streamlined” to be “amenable to subtler carrots and sticks.”53 
Third, a calibrated approach is only possible if there is a Leviathan, like the PAP 
regime, that has a strong control and monopoly of power. The regime’s absolute 
dominance of all branches of governance as well as the bureaucracy ensures that 
it can calibrate without someone throwing a spanner in the works. This crucially 
includes the primary agents of coercion, the police and the armed forces.54  
Fourth, “the least visible forms of coercion are those that use instruments that 
the public assumes are somehow natural and outside of the ruler’s control – in 
particular the invisible hand of the market, and the anonymous workings of 
technology.”55 The Leviathan in Singapore has been adapt at embracing both 
neo-liberal market policies and new technology with greater success than its 
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contemporaries largely because it takes the initiative to co-opt and harness 
market forces and new technologies rather than viewing them as inherently 
adversarial.56 Fifth, “calibrated coercion requires a certain degree of meta-
censorship: censorship of information about the exercise of censorship.”57 This 
is possible in Singapore, where the Leviathan is both monolithic and opaque, 
and has developed an extensive capacity for co-optation.  
The literature on the strategies of coercive political control have thus 
focused on the notion of a constantly expanding and evolving Leviathan that 
has continued to refine, sharpen and calibrate its strategies of control. This is 
evident in its shift away from overtly draconian and coercive measures such as 
the ISA and towards more covert legislation that is legitimised through the 
discourse of the rule of law as well as an increasing propensity to embrace a 
philosophy of self-restraint to maximise the effectiveness of control while 
minimising political cost. The literature on coercion however, is insufficient to 
fully articulate the Leviathan’s strategies of control without an analysis of the 
co-optative strategies it actively employs.  
2.5 Evolution and Expansion in the Strategies of Co-optative Political 
Control in Singapore 
The strategy of co-optation is one that has been used extensively by the PAP 
regime and it is seen as a key aspect of the PAP’s calibrated and sophisticated 
strategy of control. Abdullah (2013) notes that while the strategy of co-optation 
is one that is commonly employed, “no regime does it more deftly than the PAP 
                                                 




government. Through formal and informal means, the PAP has managed to 
successfully co-opt various people and groups into the state mechanism, and in 
the process further legitimate its rule.”58 George (2012) saw co-optation as the 
natural follow up to a strategy of calibrated coercion.59 He thus notes:  
First the Government…neutralise(s) dissenters by force, and 
shock and awe their followers into quiescence. Then it 
introduces specific legislation to nip further dissent in the 
bud…Finally it co-opts and rewards those who are prepared to 
partner the PAP.60 
Co-optation is thus seen as extensive and prevalent, a means through 
which Leviathan continually expands and extends its control across various 
sections of society. Barr (2014) has referred to democratic process and civil 
society in Singapore as a “bonsai version of the real thing…constrained, pruned, 
stunted and mainly for show.”61 The bonsai growing under the shade of the huge 
banyan tree “has no relevance or impact on the main tree” and operates in “an 
environment where the media, all the instruments of the state, and most 
elements of society are subservient to the ruling elite.”62 The Bonsai is an 
excellent metaphor for the coercion and co-optation of political opposition, civil 
society and contentious politics in Singapore. It is pruned (coerced) and left for 
display purposes (co-opted) to enhance the legitimacy of the state.  
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In the sphere of electoral politics, Rodan (2009) contends that the government 
has increasingly had to co-opt and foster a form of opposition and alternative 
views in order to “accommodate new social forces and to contain new tensions 
associated with the city state’s…development” and evolving needs.63 He argues 
that the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, formulated by the 
PAP regime to foster alternative voices, where representatives are picked by a 
special Parliamentary select committee, is a means of co-opting key civil society 
personnel and creating an alternative to electoral opposition.64  
The co-optative strategies of the state is perhaps most expounded in the 
literature studying state-religion relations in Singapore. Eugene Tan (2008) 
highlights that religion has been “co-opted in secular Singapore’s nation 
building process” and to reinforce the “teaching of moral values” and the secular 
vison of the state.65 The state thus “engages in a tightrope walk between 
secularism and control and influence over religion.”66 Tan further highlights 
that the “state is deeply involved in, concerned with and exerts a measured 
influence over religious matters” and organisations.67 This desire of the state to 
induct, yet ensure control over religion,” making sure that “religion does not 
cross over to the political domain” is most obvious in the state’s exerting a 
“symbolic and putative influence on the administration of faiths subscribed to 
by Singapore’s racial minorities, viz. Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism.”68 The state 
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through these co-optative strategies “endeavours to draw a distinction between 
public and private life in order to preserve its hegemony in the former sphere”69  
Tan (2009), builds on his earlier analysis by arguing that Singapore 
“adopts a calibrated mixture of hard and soft law” in regulating and controlling 
religious groups which attempt to “ensure that the laws generate norms and 
behaviour that become self-enforcing.”70 According to Tan, the use of ‘soft 
laws’ such as the Declaration of Religious Harmony (DRH) and the Singapore 
Muslim Identity (SMI) project is a “calibrated measure to combine reflexive 
self-regulation on the part of government” 
Thio (2005) identifies three strategies of managing religion in 
Singapore; co-operation where the state engages, sanctions and endorses 
religious practices and activities that they seem beneficial, control where the 
regime demarcates the parameters of permissible behaviour through formal 
(hard, coercive laws, eg. MRHA and ISA) and informal laws (similar to Eugene 
Tan’s soft laws, eg. DRH) and lastly co-optation, where the state yokes the 
moral and mobilizing potential of the state for nation building imperatives.71 
Thio further notes that whenever possible, the state would prefer a strategy of 
co-optation as it empowers the state.72 
Abdullah (2013) argues that the Leviathan in Singapore employs dual 
strategies of formal and informal co-optation with regards to religious 
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organisations in order to legitimize its own authority. Studying state co-optation 
of the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS) and Pergas, two muslim 
organisations in Singapore, Abdullah argues that the state “adroitly administers” 
Islam through strategies of muscular secularism and calibrated secularism.  
According to Abdullah, “muscular secularism refers to a direct, interventionist 
approach characterised by draconian measures, harsh laws and formal co-
optation” while calibrated secularism is a “more indirect form of intervention 
consisting of symbiotic relationships between religious organisations and the 
state, known as informal co-optation.”73  
The literature on the strategies of co-optative political control has shown 
that while the Leviathan continues to calibrate its strategies of control, co-
optation strategy is perceived as a tool that enhances the coercive strategies of 
political control giving strength to Rodan’s (2006) analysis that strategies of 
regime reproduction and political control in Singapore are two-pronged.74 The 
politics of control in Singapore have to be increasingly seen as a calibrated 
strategy in which coercion and co-optation are employed adroitly. However, 
there is also a need to survey the paucity of literature that examines the role of 
liberalisation in the realm of political control in Singapore.  
2.6 The Limits of Liberalisation Discourse in Singapore 
The defining characteristic of academic literature available on political 
liberalisation in state-society relations in Singapore is one of entrenched 
cynicism. There is an entrenched perspective that even if the space for political 
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participation and civil society expands, it is essentially “the PAP state that is 
expanding”75  From this perspective, “new forms of participation and 
engagement are…being championed by the state as an alternative to a liberal 
civil society and polity” as a depoliticized associational life is seen as a preferred 
option to contentious political and activist participation.76   
Ortmann (2012) notes that in spite of the “recent moves towards 
liberalization” in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections, avenues to affect 
policy making remains largely the domain of the central government and 
planning departments, leaving “little space for external policy advocacy.”77 
However, thanks to the “partial liberalization of the internet” and changing 
socio-political circumstances, the PAP regime has “been forced to accept 
alternative opinions to its dominant discourse” and “react to these new 
pressures”78  
Chong (2011) offers a unique perspective into the liberalisation of 
political space in Singapore. Highlighting that the regime has traditionally 
emphasized its image as a “morally upright and morally conservative state” 
from independence, Chong argues that increasingly the PAP has “abdicated its 
role as moral guardian of society.”79  This in turn has created a perception 
amongst conservative elements that there was a clear trend that “the PAP state, 
pressured to deliver economic growth, was becoming more tolerant of liberal 
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lifestyle values,” and “no longer desired to play a leading role when it came to 
issues of morality.”80 Chong’s argument is refreshing largely because it 
indicates that the state may be choosing to actually step back and leave spaces 
open for civil society engagement, without the active and constant participation 
of the state. Accordingly, Chong notes that “both moral conservatives and 
liberals alike have sought increasingly to make themselves heard in the hope of 
swaying public discourse and policy decisions” in a robust fashion, instead of 
acquiescing to the directions determined by the Leviathan. 
Lee (2005) perhaps offers the most sophisticated articulation of such a 
perspective. Lee notes that the discourse of “greater liberalization” in 
Singapore, advocated by the PAP leadership, beginning in the late 1980s, and 
heightened during the 1990s, was also accompanied by the “entrenchment of 
‘Out of Bound (OB) markers’, a golfing terminology that is intended to 
demarcate the parameters of political debate and thus render civil society 
meaningless.”81 Lee thus contends that: 
The use of populist rhetoric like ‘openness’ and ‘inclusiveness’ 
as representations of a ‘civic’ and/or ‘civil’ society must not be 
taken at face value, since they are often cryptic and ambiguous. 
Rather these broad concepts exemplify what I would present as 
‘gestural politics’ where, by displaying the ‘liberal’ gestures of 
the regime, Singaporean voters as well as foreign visitors would 
be attracted to the new Singapore and its leadership…In other 
words, the ‘gesture’ of civil society is more pertinent than its 
substance.82  
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Lee thus offers a compelling argument that the notion of liberalization 
in Singapore, under the close supervision of the state, cannot be anything more 
than gestural and performative politics with little actual liberalisation. Lee 
further postulates that the Speakers Corner, in Hong Lim Park with its need for 
permits and governed under the auspices of the cryptic OB markers, “is purely 
gestural, a political tactic ironically [aimed] at silencing opponents and 
libertarians who have campaigned many years for the right to open and free 
speech.”83 The “liberalization of the public sphere, and thus the expansion of 
society,” under the illusion of gestural politics, “if successfully executed…will 
improve the PAP government’s legitimacy and longevity.”84 
2.7 Concluding Thoughts 
The literature on liberalisation in state-society relations in Singapore and its role 
in political control in Singapore has been highly deficient and pessimistic when 
studied. Given the extensive role of strategies of coercion and co-optation in 
political control, this is hardly surprising. However, the lack of engagement with 
the discourse of liberalisation as a tool of political control in Singapore exposes 
deficiencies in the literature that needs to be addressed.  
Firstly the notion of gestural politics, while informative, negates the 
possibility of any possible evolution. If all developments in the realm of civil 
society is gestural, then there no longer is any need for a study of it. 
Furthermore, all of politics is in essence marred by an element of performance 
and is therefore on some level gestural. As such, gestural politics as advocated 
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by Lee (2005) while insightful on many levels, is also highly limiting due to its 
coloured lenses. 
Secondly, there is increasing consensus that the Leviathan in Singapore 
adopts a calibrated strategy of control which is constantly expanding. To a large 
extent however, the literature has revolved around a calibration between the 
strategies of coercion and co-optation, while merely coercive strategy is seen as 
ineffective and too politically costly. The strategy of co-optation however, 
requires the presence of an individual or a structured organisation. A mob for 
example cannot be co-opted largely because it neither possesses leaders or a 
structure to identify and co-opt or coerce in a calibrated fashion.  
The protest movements that have occurred in contemporary Singapore 
thus expose gaps and deficiencies in the literature. These movements are often 
organised online and take place without any elected leader. It would also often 
be too politically costly to use repressive and coercive measures on them. The 
presence of these movements from time to time indicate that increasingly, as we 
strive to understand the PAP’s calibrated approach to political control, we need 







 Theory and Framework 
 
3.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter aims to build on the existing literature on calibrated approaches to 
political control in Singapore by expanding current analysis on dual levels. 
Firstly it expounds a theory of calibrated liberalisation as a strategy that is 
increasingly being used by the state in Singapore. Having done so, it builds on  
the current conceptualisation of calibrated approaches by offering a new 
framework of a ‘spectrum of control’ on which the government adopts a more 
expansive calibrated strategy by adopting various calibrated strategies of 
coercion, co-optation and liberalisation in different levels to address differing 
cases of dissent.  
The chapter begins by setting the parameters for the theory of calibrated 
liberalisation. It then defines and explicates the theory of calibrated 
liberalisation. Having done so, the chapter moves on to explain key questions 
surrounding the theory, by articulating why a strategy of calibrated 
liberalisation is necessary, what the key benefits of such a theory are, and why 
it is a feasible strategy. The chapter then moves on to articulate what the key 
characteristics of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation are before highlighting 
red flag issues, which greatly restrict the probability of a strategy of calibrated 
liberalisation being used. Lastly the chapter examines the spectrum of control 
as a new framework through which a strategy of calibrated liberalisation along 
with other strategies of control are calibrated to address new challenges and 
forms of organised dissent.  
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3.2 Setting the Parameters 
The State as the Leviathan 
It has been noted above that attempts to study the Singapore state has focused 
on the monolithic nature of the regime which has established firm control over 
almost all facets of governance. As I have sufficiently discussed the various 
academic perceptions of the Singapore state, I will now focus exclusively on 
Slater’s (2010) concept of ‘Authoritarian Leviathans’ as this dissertation’s basis 
for conceptualising the nature of the Singapore regime.  
Slater defines Authoritarian Leviathans as “regimes that seek to use the 
full force of the state apparatus to subjugate society into a hierarchical, 
command centered body politic on a presumptively permanent basis,” forged 
by ‘protection pacts’ between elites.85  Slater defines these protection pacts as 
“broad elite coalitions unified by shared support for heightened state power and 
tightened authoritarian controls as institutional bulwarks against continued or 
renewed mass unrest,” seeing them as the strongest coalitional basis for 
authoritarian regimes to both extract resources from elites and to organise their 
most powerful elites.”86 
The formation of these protection pacts and a broad elite coalition that 
leads to the formation of a formidable Leviathan is dependent on the presence 
of contentious politics that threaten to destabilise the fundamental interests of 
elites which includes the security of these elites and threats of redistribution.87 
Slater contends that when “conflicts are perceived as both endemic and 
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unmanageable…authoritarian regimes enjoy an excellent opportunity to craft a 
protection pact: a pro-authoritarian coalition linking upper groups on the basis 
of shared perceptions of threat.”88 Such powerful protection pacts enable 
Leviathans to extract formidable acquiescence, consent and resources from 
elites, getting each group of elites to play supporting roles in strengthening the 
legitimacy, power and control of these regimes. 
Slater perceives Singapore as the “strongest authoritarian Leviathan in 
Southeast Asia”89 and his concept is particularly useful in understanding the 
capacity of the regime to effectively employ various strategies of control, 
largely due to the strong, broad levels of cohesion between elites. It also 
highlights the high levels of co-optation that have always existed within the 
regime where potentially powerful individuals and groups are quickly brought 
within the fold whenever possible instead of a recourse to suppression and 
coercion.  
Furthermore, in a strong Leviathan, like the Singapore regime, power, 
resources and control always flows “from elites to Leviathan, and not the 
reverse,” leaving the Leviathan with the sole capacity to redistribute power.90 
This extractive capacity and the power to unilaterally distribute power and 
resources is further strengthened when Leviathans exhibit strong organisational 
capacities. Slater argues that “it is primarily through the crafting of new political 
institutions that protection pacts gain their solidity over time.”91  
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In Singapore, the threat of a radical left and Chinese chauvinism, as well 
as the fears and anxieties of communal conflict during separation from Malaysia 
drove elites into the arms of the PAP government, itself divorced from its leftist 
elements, and made up of elites fighting for political survival. The PAP’s use of 
naked repression against supposed radical elements was thus met with tacit elite 
approval and its strong state measures towards state-building and scripting 
nationhood post-separation, especially with regards to race and religion were 
thus often met with approval and applause by elites who had come to perceive 
communal conflict as a endemic possibility in the absence of a strong state.  
Since the independence of Singapore, the Leviathan has strengthened 
both its extractive capabilities and its coalition pact through the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) and the provision of public housing through the Housing 
Development Board (HDB) as well as grassroots organisations such as Citizens 
Consultative Committees (CCCs) and the People’s Association (PA). These 
policies enabled the Leviathan to induct a large proportion of the population, 
notably the rapidly expanding middle class “into the evolving authoritarian 
power structure.”92 With basic welfare provision as well as a vast amount of 
capital invested into the system, most Singaporeans are both beholden and 
dependent on the stability of the Leviathan for their economic survival and 
progress. Slater thus argues that the CPF and especially the HDB, must be 
perceived as the “institutional exertion of the state’s formidable ordering power, 
not simply as a policy of regime provision.”93   
                                                 




The early co-optation of elites, the strong coalitional protection pact, the 
creation of strong institutions and the Leviathan’s vast capabilities to order 
power married with the inherent enforced interest of a vast majority of 
Singaporeans in resistance to any attempts at destabilizing the regime ensures 
that there are very limited avenues towards dissent and points towards a few 
observations in understanding political control in Singapore:  
1. The state possesses a vast capacity of tools it can employ to control the 
population. 
2. The people themselves have a great investment in the stability of the 
regime and therefore have very limited options for engineering change.  
3. The Leviathan can therefore expand its arsenal of control to include 
liberalizing spaces that do not threaten its core hegemonic ability 
because the people have a vested interest in ensuring they do not end up 
destabilizing the system and therefore the Leviathan that governs it.  
This dissertation employs the Leviathan as a means of comprehending the 
Singapore regime, with an appreciation for the formidable levers at its disposal. 
This section studying Slater’s arguments is essential because it has articulated 
why the Leviathan in Singapore through perceptions of endemic vulnerability 
and the establishment of strong institutions has created strong attitudinal and 
institutional mechanisms of regime stability, creating a system where “the 
ruling regime’s power advantage is so vast as to make a collective political 
challenge impossible.”94 It also enables us to understand why the Leviathan in 
Singapore is capable of constantly expanding its strategies of control and using 
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lighter instruments, including the liberalisation of spaces, without having to 
worry excessively about regime stability.  
While the concept of a Leviathan explains state capacity, it does not fully 
explain the concept of control and the basis through which control is established. 
It is essential to note that while the Leviathan is extremely powerful, it is not 
omnipotent and while dissent in Singapore is muted, it is not absent. The 
Leviathan thus finds itself having to constantly renegotiate its hegemony and its 
political control.  
Perceiving Control/ Hegemony – A Gramscian Perspective 
There is hence a need to articulate the conceptual understanding of political 
control that this dissertation employs in its analysis of the Leviathan in 
Singapore. This dissertation uses the Gramscian concept of hegemony in 
articulating the central role of consent and persuasion in entrenching the 
political control enjoyed by a regime.  
Benedetto Fontana’s analysis of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1993) 
defines it “as intellectual and moral leadership (direzione) whose principal 
elements are consent and persuasion.”95 A ruling class thus assumes hegemony 
when it is able to institute and entrench core ideological and cultural pillars that 
are embraced by the vast majority of the people. The subordinated classes, fully 
accepting this now naturalized perspective of the world, come to accept it as 
common sense, which according to Gramsci, is how a subordinate class 
acquiesces to its subservience, with willing, tacit and even enthusiastic 
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consent.96 Gramsci perceived common sense as “not something rigid and 
immobile” but as a perceived reality that “is continually transforming itself.”97  
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and common sense however, is not one 
of static and impervious ideological control. Rather, hegemony is an ongoing 
process of negotiation and struggle in which consent has to be continually re-
established. Hence, for Gramsci, hegemony is never undisputed and 
unchallenged and “is always the (temporary) mastery of a particular theatre of 
struggle.”98 Gramsci viewed civil society as the sphere in which this ideological 
struggle took place. It was the realm in which consent was manufactured, and 
political control was constantly negotiated.  
Furthermore, it is essential to assert that while Gramsci perceived 
hegemony as means of establishing control via consent and persuasion, he 
conceded that political leadership and state hegemony involved the confluence 
of consent and coercion, which he perceived as being “indivisible” and “porous 
to one another.”99 This suggests that the politics of consent and persuasion are 
predicated on the politics of violence. Thus, state hegemony according to 
Gramsci, “is characterized by a hegemonic equilibrium based on a combination 
of force and consent, which are balanced in varying proportions.”100 
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The above discussion is beneficial to the development of this 
dissertation on multiple levels. Firstly, by applying the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony to the context of Singapore, it enables us to dispense with the notion 
of authoritarian hegemonic rule as rigid and static with one predominant cultural 
source of power that is immune to change. Rather it enables us to perceive 
political control in Singapore as a continual process, with the recognition that 
hegemonies are continually being reconstructed with a shifting common sense 
and that there are “ongoing ‘projects’ of legitimating leadership and negotiating 
consent through a whole series of channels” and varied strategies.101  
It is therefore imperative to demonstrate and establish the means through 
which the Singaporean Leviathan attempts to assert control through coercive 
measures like detention and libel suits as well as co-optative policies that 
attempt to absorb potential dissent into the ranks of the ruling party and its 
subservient bureaucracy. Equally important is the understanding that in the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony that presumes counter-hegemonic contestation 
as an evolving certainty, the state never enjoys absolute hegemony.  
As such, it is essential to study how the PAP regime concedes space to 
counter-hegemonic forces without employing coercive force which in many 
instances may be too costly to its ideological hegemony of consent. The politics 
of control and hegemony may thus necessitate in certain instances, under certain 
conditions, and pressures, to involve liberalising spaces in civil society and 
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making concessions to subaltern groups, especially when the core ideological 
pillars of hegemony are not threatened.  
The Limits of Coercion 
As mentioned above, it is also essential to briefly consider why the Singapore 
Leviathan would not employ purely coercive strategies in order to stamp out 
dissent, given that it exists in such limited spaces in Singapore. This dissertation 
employs Hannah Arendt’s (1970) discussion of violence and power. According 
to Arendt, power “corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert” with power never “being the property of an individual” as it “belongs 
to a group and remains in existence as long as the group keeps together.”102 
Power is thus dependent on support and a popular perception of legitimacy.103 
When employed with regards to earlier discussions on the Leviathan, it seems 
particularly relevant to note that the power of the Leviathan is dependent on the 
acquiescence of the various elite groups in the coalition and the endurance of 
the protection pact. The Leviathan in Singapore, strengthened by its broad 
coalition that has come to include its vast middle classes, is thus also limited by 
its need to be seen as a protector rather than an oppressor.  
Arendt makes a compelling argument that while power can employ 
violence, it cannot find legitimacy solely based on it. George (2007), building 
on Arendt’s argument notes that “what power needs is legitimacy, and 
legitimacy is what is lost when violence is misapplied.”104 The key conclusion 
of her argument, therefore, is that the use of coercive force, is highly costly in 
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terms of political power, and hence must be used with restraint in order to 
maximise political power and control. George (2012) highlights that “Singapore 
can be seen as a textbook case of a state that has adopted a long term view of 
power, deliberately reining in its use of force in order to build ideological 
consensus” and hegemony.105  
The Leviathan in Singapore, it may thus be argued, is highly dependent 
on maintaining its broad coalition of elite support and ideological consensus in 
order to sustain its political power and control. While it possesses  great leverage 
and latitude while constraining the scope of dissent, it constantly needs to 
renegotiate its hegemony and cannot afford highly costly strategies of coercion 
if it continues to have a long term strategy towards political control and power.  
This is particularly pertinent when one seeks to study new and different 
challenges to the Leviathan. As noted in the literature review, the study of 
political control in Singapore has largely revolved around the use of calibrated 
strategies of coercion and co-optation, with liberalisation given a largely 
negligible and viewed with a largely cynical perspective. It has also been 
articulated that this has resulted in a gap in the literature that fails to address 
how the Leviathan has attempted to address the protest movements in Singapore 
since 2011.  
In the following section, taking into consideration the discussion 
employed earlier in this chapter, I offer a theory of calibrated liberalisation that 
I argue will help fill the gap in the literature. The Leviathan it will be argued, 
given its broad coalitional support and extensive institutional strength possesses 
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great latitude and leverage in terms of strategies and can afford to liberalize 
strategically in order to strengthen control in more crucial spaces and extend 
political control and enhance its hegemony through establishing ideological 
consensus.  
3.3 A Theory of Calibrated Liberalisation 
In this section, addressing the discussions above and in the previous chapter, I 
forward a theory of calibrated liberalisation, which I contend is increasingly an 
important strategy of the Leviathan in Singapore.  Before launching into a 
definition of the strategy, it is perhaps prudent to isolate and define both the 
terms liberalisation and calibration in the context of this dissertation.  
Defining Liberalisation 
Liberalisation, is an extremely loaded term, with greatly varied interpretations. 
It is employed in this dissertation, in a very narrow context, as a strategy of a 
Leviathan to extend and strengthen control. All notions of liberalisation as a 
democratising phenomenon thus have to be thrown out of the proverbial 
window. This dissertation’s conceptualisation of liberalisation is built on 
Terence Lee’s notion of gestural politics, which as we discussed in the literature 
review chapter, referred to the performative nature of “greater liberalisation” in 
Singapore, which under the close supervision of the state, had created a political 
culture in which “the ‘gesture’ of civil society is more pertinent than its 
substance.”106 Lee thus correctly perceived that liberalisation under such 
controlled auspices was always a calculated strategy engineered to extend and 
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strengthen the political control of the Leviathan. Indeed, Lee notes that the 
“liberalization of the public sphere, and thus the expansion of society,” under 
the illusion of gestural politics, “if successfully executed…will improve the 
PAP government’s legitimacy and longevity.”107 Lee however, dismisses the 
strategy of liberalisation by the Leviathan as being simply cosmetic without 
tangible change. This I contend is a cynical perspective that masks the more 
sophisticated approach employed by the regime.  
Terence Chong (2011) has noted that increasingly the PAP has 
“abdicated its role as moral guardian of society,” as it “no longer desired to play 
a leading role when it came to issues of morality.”108 As I noted in the literature 
review, this indicates that the regime may be choosing to actually step back and 
leave spaces open for civil society groups to contest and discuss, without the 
active and constant participation of the regime, with the state taking a back seat 
as a manager or adjudicator, rather than an active participant.109   Liberalisation, 
in the context of this dissertation, is a conscious, sophisticated strategy of 
control, in which the state consciously chooses to step back from the public 
sphere, to allow for active discourse and participation within the public sphere 
without active state participation.  
Defining Calibration 
As we have noted above, there has been an increasing emphasis on the notion 
of a calibrated approach to political control in the literature. Many analysts 
including George (2005, 2007, 2012), Abdullah (2013), Thio (2005), and Tan 
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(2009) have highlighted that the Leviathan employs a calibrated strategy of 
either coercion or co-optation to ensure political control in various areas such 
as the press, religion and civil society. This dissertation seeks to build on the 
available wealth of literature by firstly expanding on the definition of calibration 
and by employing it towards the regime’s approach towards liberalisation as 
well.  
George (2012) focused his theory of calibrated coercion on two basic 
notions; firstly, a constant expansion of the means of control and secondly the 
active use of self-restraint in terms of using these tools for the purpose of 
maximising the effectiveness of control at minimum political cost.110 Abdullah 
(2013), in his analysis of the Leviathan’s co-optative strategies towards 
religious institutions, offers a theory of calibrated secularism, in which the state 
adopted a subtler more informal co-optative strategy where possible together 
with a more direct strategy of co-optation of muscular secularism. Similarly, 
Tan (2009) postulates that Singapore “adopts a calibrated mixture of hard and 
soft law” in regulating and controlling religious groups which attempt to 
“ensure that the laws generate norms and behaviour that become self-
enforcing.”111  
This dissertation builds on this consensus by defining a calibrated 
approach as one which is focused on the notion of self-restraint, in which 
subtler, softer approaches are employed whenever possible to minimize political 
cost, while maximizing political control. A calibrated approach to political 
control also constantly seeks to expand and evolve with changing political 
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challenges and demands. It is also reflective of the Leviathan’s ability to adroitly 
shift and take varied approaches to different contexts and situations.  
A calibrated approach to strategies of control is also reflective of the 
guiding ideologies of the Singapore regime – elitism, pragmatism and a 
technocratic leadership and governing approach that believes policies can be 
adjusted and fine-tuned with almost mathematical precision.112 This is 
important largely because it highlights the state’s approach and perspective 
towards solving issues. A calibrated approach is feasible and preferred largely 
because the guiding philosophies of the Leviathan suggest that it is a natural 
direction it would embark on.  
Much of the literature on calibrated strategies in Singapore has been 
limited to perceiving calibration as the fine-tuning of approaches towards 
individual strategies; eg. Calibrated co-optation or calibrated coercion. This 
dissertation perceives calibration on dual levels. Firstly it perceives calibration 
within the individual strategy of liberalisation. It acknowledges however that a 
strategy of calibrated liberalisation cannot stand alone and that the Singapore 
Leviathan’s calibrated approach to political control almost always involves a 
calibration of various strategies in tandem; eg. Coercion, co-optation and 
liberalisation. This expands the scope of analysis largely and offers a broader 
basis for conceptual analysis.  
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Defining Calibrated Liberalisation 
Calibrated liberalisation may thus be defined as a conscious strategy employed 
by the state to step back in certain instances to allow for increased discourse and 
activism in the public sphere without active state participation. 
3.4 Why is such a strategy necessary? 
Functioning in a ‘new normal’ 
Following the 2011 General Elections, there was a heightened sense of 
optimism with regards to political discourse in Singapore. Observers predicted 
a definitive “transitioning to a new normal,” namely a more liberal and open 
form of politics in Singapore.113 The consensus was that the 2011 elections 
would “likely be regarded as the starting point of (an) epochal political 
transition.”114  
Other observers interpreted the elections as indicative of broad public 
discontent with the incumbent PAP government and argued that while still 
authoritarian, Singapore was now “newly competitive.”115 Although many of 
these pundits were also quick to point out that these assertions were potentially 
“misleading”116 and that it was difficult to discern “whether the party will be 
able to reinvent itself and stay convincingly at the centre of a more resilient one 
party state”117, there was a strong belief that there was a “desire among 
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Singaporeans for a more open and vibrant political system (which) points to a 
nascent growing political consciousness.”118  
Tan (2012) further noted the emerging “perspective that national matters 
are not just the sole preserve of politicians” and that there “was a growing need 
for the political system…to affirm that the citizen’s voice matters.”119 The 
lesson was that the government had to show a willingness to listen, and to give 
space for the people to express themselves in the public sphere without being 
seen as dominating and policing the discussion.  
While the 2015 election has seemingly put to rest the concept that 
electoral politics in Singapore was becoming increasingly, never mind ‘newly’ 
competitive, it does not seem to have reversed the ‘lesson’ that the Leviathan 
had to learn to humble itself to the voices of the people. Indeed, following the 
victory of the PAP in the 2015 general elections, the rhetoric from the victorious 
PAP camp and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was strongly focused on being 
“deeply humbled” by the mandate accorded to him by the people.120 He further 
noted that a key “issue in this election has been the desire for diverse voices to 
be heard and given more weight” and that the government had to find more 
avenues for these diverse and even dissenting voices to be heard, albeit in a 
“way that maintains the unique strengths of (the) system.”121  
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This message of the need for greater humility and willingness on the part 
of the ruling elite to listen was repeated by the Prime Minister, in both his open 
letter to his MPs as well as an open letter to the PAP website. Other key leaders 
within the PAP also adopted ‘humility’ as an important feature of governance 
following the elections.  Ambassador at Large Chan Heng Chee noted in her 
analysis of the 2015 election results that “in the ‘new normal’ of Singapore 
politics, expect the ‘old normal’ but with an electorate that is now more 
demanding, seeking participation (a voice), and more accountability than ever 
before.”122  
The last two general elections in 2011 and 2015, by Singapore standards, 
have produced quite different outcomes. Yet the key conclusions from both 
elections seem to point to the need for increased humility and a more attentive 
attitude from the government as well as the desire for greater space in the public 
sphere for the voicing of alternative opinions. A strategy of calibrated 
liberalisation in which the state increasingly recedes strategically is thus 
increasingly necessary in order to facilitate a more vocal and assertive populace 
in a way that ‘maintains the unique strengths of the system.’ 
3.5 The Benefits of a strategy of Calibrated Liberalisation 
Functions as a vent for repressed frustrations 
As we have noted above, there is an increasing consensus that ordinary 
Singaporeans need a means to vent deeply held frustrations in a way that is not 
politically too costly. Yet the 2015 General Elections suggest that many 
                                                 




Singaporeans do not seem to desire drastic political change. In fact there seems 
to be a genuine fear that an election could destabilize the regime or even bring 
about regime change. Most Singaporeans simply crave a means through which 
frustrations can be articulated without dire repercussions.  
Social media platforms such as Facebook often function effectively as 
an outlet for frustrations, as long as certain limits are not crossed. Protest 
gatherings in the prescribed venue of Hong Lim Park, within legal boundaries 
and hence the reluctant blessing of the state, are thus increasingly viewed as a 
way to ‘let off steam’ against unpopular policies and to let the government know 
that large numbers feel they are causing substantial distress.   
The idea that, given the presence of a strong Leviathan, strategic 
liberalisation can function as a pressure vent without destabilizing the regime 
has resonance in the study of authoritarian regimes as well. Brownlee (2007) 
argues that in the face of strong elite cohesion within a hegemonic ruling 
coalition and institutional structure (a Leviathan), liberalizing gestures do not 
result in definitive political change or contestation.123 Although opposition or 
dissenting movements are accorded a “further venue in which to face a cohesive 
elite,” the “asymmetry of power between the groups will persist, and 
incumbents would remain entrenched.”124 Organised dissent and protest, even 
mass protest, can be contained and deflected so long as a regime’s political 
coalition coheres.”125 The presence of a strong Leviathan thus enables the 
creation of strategic liberalised spaces that can accommodate a more articulate 
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and assertive populace with strong dissenting opinions without fundamental 
change resulting.  
Functions as a possible unfiltered feedback channel 
As noted above, one of the key conclusions from the past two general elections 
in Singapore has been that there needs to be more feedback and communication 
with the government. The Leviathan in Singapore as we have noted above has 
traditionally preferred using top-down grassroots organisations and feedback 
channels monitored by organisations co-opted by the regime, often at their 
inception.  
Increasingly however there is tacit recognition from the state that their 
co-opted grassroots networks no longer function effectively as means of public 
feedback, often clogged by groupthink and multiple levels of self-censorship. A 
calibrated liberalisation approach, which allows for increased space without 
active state participation permits the state to get a clearer, unadulterated 
response from the people on certain issues, particularly from the more 
dissenting extremes of society, which the state would otherwise struggle to 
engage. This is especially so given that official feedback structures are often 
shunned by dissenting groups in society.   
3.6 Why is such an approach feasible?  
  
The Surveillance State 
 
The Leviathan in Singapore can afford to liberalise spaces and step back from 
active participation because it can monitor without participating, and 
participants are fully aware they are within the clear view of the state. Singapore 
is perhaps the best example of a surveillance state, and in many ways under the 
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auspices of a strong Leviathan, is “the perfect home for a centrally controlled, 
complex technological system designed to maintain national order.”126 Harris 
(2014) argues that Singapore’s “embrace of mass surveillance” fits well with its 
existence as a “law and order society” where the “definition of “order is all-
encompassing.”127  
Furthermore the presence of mass surveillance in Singapore and its use 
by the state is not hidden from its citizens. Instead, like strong laws, 
Singaporeans tacitly accept the presence of mass surveillance in exchange for 
security from external threats and internal sources of strife, a perspective 
derived from the vulnerability discourse that forms a crucial thread in the 
national narrative and philosophy. Harris contends that “in Singapore, 
electronic surveillance of residents is pervasive and widely accepted.”128 
Beyond electronic surveillance, there is also constant surveillance of 
public spaces. Indeed, it is worth noting that “no form of surveillance is as 
pervasive in Singapore as its network of security cameras” which exist in almost 
all public spaces, including void decks of HDB blocks and even lifts, carparks 
and on streetlamps. Of particular interest to this dissertation is the presence of 
these cameras in Hong Lim Park, the only venue allotted for organised protest 
in Singapore.  
The Leviathan’s expansive capacity for surveillance both on the internet, 
where protest movements are largely organised, and in the designated physical 
spaces where organised protest is allowed ensures that the state can continue to 
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be present and view, even when it does not actively participate; a situation that 
protestors are only too aware of.  
 Lee (2005), evoking Foucault, argues that “in a panoptic and auto-
regulatory environment such as Singapore, the technologies of governmentality 
can be readily mobilised for various social, cultural and indeed, political 
ends.”129 The function of a culture of auto-regulation, according to Lee, “is the 
cultivation of a well-disciplined, hardworking, moral-minded technology-savvy 
and a self-regulated politically compliant cultural citizen.”130  
It may thus be argued that by using “its well-documented ability to 
utilise ‘visible’ technological and legal apparatuses…Singaporean authorities 
have demonstrated” how, by using “centralised control,” and the “elegance of 
discipline” of the panoptic gaze, “docility-utility” may be extracted from 
citizens by ensuring a necessary level of auto regulation where even dissidents 
and protestors observe a basic level of discipline and generally do not transgress 
the prescribed limits of what is deemed ‘tolerable’ dissent.131  As we shall 
observe later, interviewees who had participated in and organised protest 
movements professed a high level of anxiety about following the letter of the 
law strictly so as to not tempt a coercive response from the state, often citing a 
desire to be ‘responsible citizens.’ 
An Evolved strategy of control 
It is also imperative to understand that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation is 
to a large extent feasible because it is not in any sense a drastic shift in strategy 
for the Leviathan. Rather than a revolutionary shift of policy, it in many ways 
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represents an evolutionary shift and indeed expansion of strategy by the 
Leviathan. Observers who recall the regimes’ hard coercive stand  n organised 
protests in decades past as well as the persecution of noted opposition members 
such as Chee Soon Juan when civil disobedience and protest marches were 
attempted may be tempted to conclude that the regime’s rather benevolent 
response to the protest movements since 2011 represents a drastic shift in policy. 
However such conclusions fail to clearly identify the characteristics of a 
calibrated liberalisation approach and the origins of its evolution.  
These protest movements and the Leviathan’s strategy towards them 
have largely evolved from its approach towards regulating the internet, 
described by the Media Development Authority of Singapore (MDA), the state 
regulator as a “light touch” which has focused more on a more liberal 
management of the internet as opposed to its “notoriously strict and censorious 
‘lockdown’ traditional print and broadcast media.”132 The regime’s light touch 
approach has largely revolved around the use of Class License Scheme (1996) 
which along with the ‘Internet Code of Practice’ (1997) has focused on ‘self-
regulation’ as a means of regulating the internet.  
Lee (2010) however notes that “the power of a light-touch self-
regulatory regime…lies in the way it operates carte-blanche in a ‘catch-all’ 
manner”; “any person or group posting content on the vast and ever-enlarging 
space of the internet becomes a de facto licensee as an ‘Internet Content 
Provider’ defined under the Class Licence.”133 There is also an active 
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reinforcement of the message that other sweeping laws “such as the Penal Code, 
Defamation Act, Sedition Act and Maintenance of Religious Act apply as much 
to communications on the Internet as they do in traditional print and 
broadcasting media.”134   
The ‘liberal’ approach towards the internet thus takes place in the 
context of multiple layers of broad-scoped laws which gives regulators highly 
discretionary powers to deal with potential transgressors. Indeed, “with all 
possible bases covered, the MDA could openly lay claim to being ‘light-
handed’, transparent and fair” and open to allowing honest dialogue on the 
internet.135 This, according to Lee (2010), results in a system of ‘auto-
regulation’, where online users as “governed cultural citizens are steered 
towards making ‘correct choices and decisions via the joint application of 
legislative codes with other subtle mechanisms of discipline.”136 The Internet is 
thus an example of a ‘space’ in which greater liberalisation has been permitted 
with a light-touch approach while promoting a culture of auto-regulation and 
self-censorship.  
The reasons why a strategy of calibrated liberalisation towards the 
protest movements since 2011 have largely evolved from the Leviathan’s 
strategy towards regulating the internet are twofold. The first is that the internet 
and its constant evolution as a means of mass communication, from websites, 
to blogs, to social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, has in 
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many ways been an evolving challenge to the PAP and as such reflects its most 
recent calibrated approaches.  
The second reason is the fact that most of these movements are popular 
movements that have mobilised via social networking platforms on the internet, 
most notably Facebook. They largely lack an organisational structure and are 
composed of unofficial groups on networking sites where information is passed 
by word of mouth. The challenges these groups present are thus highly 
connected to the challenges social networking sites present. Unlike earlier 
protest movements and organised dissent in Singapore’s history, there are no 
formal groups, associations, and institutions, behind these protest movements 
that can be coerced or co-opted. The Leviathan’s strategy has thus necessarily 
evolved from its approach towards the internet, even when the discussion and 
dissent leaves the virtual world and enters the real one.  
3.7 Key Characteristics of a strategy of Calibrated Liberalisation 
Having noted that the origins of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation are largely 
evolutionary, we should articulate some of the key characteristics of such a 
strategy. Firstly, while a strategy of calibrated liberalisation has the potential to 
be both proactive and reactive, since 2011 it has largely functioned as a reactive 
strategy in practice. The state responds to a groundswell on the internet and in 
the public sphere and then decides on the calibration of its policy.  
The reactive nature of the strategy is indicative of the PAP’s approach 
towards control discussed above. The presence of broad, wide ranging powers 
defined in ambiguous terms which give the Leviathan incredible latitude in 
terms of defining dissent, coupled with the presence of vaguely defined 
‘outward-bound markers’ and ‘sacred cows’ in terms of what constitutes 
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acceptable norms in public discourse, creates a self-regulating culture where 
even activists are keen to avoid sanction by erring on the side of caution and 
adopting a subtle approach. A reactive approach to liberalisation thus keeps 
activists guessing as to the response of the state, which can oscillate between a 
range of coercive methods and more liberal gestures. Does this then indicate 
that state strategy towards these protest movements and dissent in general is 
largely contradictory and haphazard, with an almost schizophrenic quality?  
This dissertation argues that given the calibrated, calculated nature of 
the Leviathan, such an argument is mistaken. The second key characteristic of 
a strategy of a calibrated liberalisation is to set the level of liberalisation 
accorded by the state according to the threat perceived by the Leviathan in 
relation to the movement. The level of threat perceived is largely dependent on 
the key individuals and groups involved as well as the key issues that the protest 
movement purports to address.  
Thus, less threatening issues which are perceived not to affect the core 
pillars of the Leviathan’s hegemony are more likely to be accorded greater space 
without the active participation and intervention of the state. Similarly, if a 
protest movement is spearheaded by activists largely without an affiliation with 
opposition political parties, who are perceived to not have political motivations 
or electoral ambitions, there is a greater chance for a more liberal calibration of 
state strategy. 
The third key characteristic of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation is 
that it rarely functions as a lone strategy. As noted above, this dissertation 
defines a calibrated strategy as one that functions as one of several strategies in 
tandem, so that coercion, co-optation and liberalisation all work together. A 
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strategy of calibrated liberalisation thus often involves not just a decision to step 
back and allow for active discussion and activism in the public sphere without 
active state participation but also is often partnered with coercive and co-
optative strategies as well. In order to grasp the use of calibrated liberalisation 
as a strategy, and to highlight the expansive nature of calibrated strategies of 
control, I suggest that we perceive these strategies of political control as 
functioning on what I term a spectrum of control. 
3.8 ‘Red Flag’ Issues  
Before turning to the idea of the spectrum of control however, it is essential to 
first examine situations in which a strategy of calibrated liberalisation becomes 
muted, limited or even insignificant. These are as ‘red flag’ issues in relation to 
which calibrated liberalisation no longer forms part of the Leviathan’s strategy. 
The first red flag is that of race and religion. The legacy of racial and 
religious riots in Singapore’s pre-independence history, supplies a key element 
of the vulnerability narrative that forms a core pillar of the state’s hegemony 
and elite protection pact. The management of religion and race has thus long 
been seen as a problem that has to be cautiously navigated by the Leviathan. 
Abdullah (2013) notes that the state exercises “great caution” in its careful 
supervision of religion in Singapore, given the “potential volatility inherent in 
religion” as well as its ability to function as a rallying point and means of mass 
mobilization, potentially in opposition to the state on certain issues.137  
Tan (2008) observes that the state “maintains a watchful eye…and is 
willing to move pre-emptively against any threat to social cohesion and 
harmony,” operating from “a conservative and realist premise that religious 
                                                 
137 Abdullah, “Religious Representation,” 1182-1183. 
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premise that religious harmony cannot be taken for granted.” 138 He also 
contends that “this overarching fear and vulnerability ensure that close scrutiny, 
interventionist surveillance, and ultra-sensitivity to perceived threats are 
hallmarks of the government’s policy towards religion.”139 The Leviathan’s 
extensive caution and ultra-sensitivity towards race and religion makes any 
strategy that involves the state stepping back and refraining from active 
discussion and participation highly improbable, thus making it a red flag issue. 
The second red flag is allegations against the Leviathan itself, 
particularly those that question the integrity of key political leaders in the ruling 
party, who function as the faces of the Leviathan. The political history of 
Singapore is littered with defamation and libel suits against opposition 
politicians and critics of the state who have made even the slightest of 
slanderous accusations that impinge the integrity of politicians from the ruling 
PAP party.140 A claim to incorruptibility and unquestionable integrity have long 
been the hallmarks of PAP’s political legitimacy.  
Mauzy and Milne (2002) claim that “the PAP has always stood for purity 
and anti-corruption as symbolized by the white uniform worn by PAP members 
on official occasions.”141 They further note that the PAP leaders “do not tolerate 
corruption…among themselves, and they are conscious that they must be seen 
to be living up to their own high standards.”142 Similarly, Rajah (2012) argues 
that the state’s narrative of “corruption-free delivery of social order and 
efficiency” is highly “effective in securing continuing economic and political 
                                                 
138 Tan, “Keeping God,”58. 
139 Tan, “Keeping God,”59. 
140 Rajah, Authoritarian rule, 17-20. See also Mauzy and Milne (2002), 134 – 136. 
141 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore Politics, 7. 
142 Ibid., 54. 
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legitimacy” amongst the citizenry. Khong (1995) notes that the Singapore 
state’s “claim to moral authority is based on public recognition of its 
performance record,” which is determined by economic performance and the 
perceived incorruptibility of the government.143  
This moral authority, now institutionalised, relies heavily on the 
unquestionable incorruptibility and honesty of Lee Kuan Yew and his pioneer 
generation of PAP leaders; an image subsequent generations of leaders have 
been anxious to perpetuate. The Leviathan’s ultra-sensitivity and intolerance 
towards accusations against the integrity and incorruptibility of its political 
leaders makes any strategy that involves the state stepping back and refraining 
from active discussion and participation in debates on this topic highly 
improbable. 
3.9 The Spectrum of Control  
This dissertation has posited that increasingly, the Leviathan’s strategy in terms 
of dealing with dissent and enhancing political control is calibrated over a 
widening range of various strategies. This means that while the state continues 
to take a calibrated approach towards coercion, co-optation and increasingly 
liberalisation, these strategies themselves are often used in tandem and 
calibrated at different levels to suit the state’s prescription for different issues.  
It is thus argued that in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of 
the calibrated nature of state strategy, we have to situate these strategies on what 
I have termed a ‘Spectrum of Control’. A spectrum may be understood as “a 
broad range of varied but related ideas or objects, the individual features of 
                                                 
143 Khong, “Singapore”, 133. 
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which tend to overlap so as to form a continuous series or sequence.”144 
Similarly, a spectrum of control refers to a range of varied strategies that can 
overlap and can be used in tandem to offer a singular calibrated strategy of 
control for a particular issue or case of dissent. At a basic level the strategies 
may be represented as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1 (Source; Author) 
The strategy of liberalisation exists at one end of the spectrum while a 
strategy of coercion exists at the other end, and co-optation is placed at the 
centre. Thus, the spectrum of control is arranged according to the severity of 
government intervention with a highly coercive use of force at one end and 
negligible government intervention at the other. Co-optation exists in the centre 
with the understanding that co-optative strategies can co-exist with both liberal 
and coercive features.145 It is a strategy that generally lacks the severity of 
coercion while being more intrusive and severe than one of liberalisation.  
                                                 
144 Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spectrum. 
145 Abdullah, “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore” 2013 
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When one considers the strategy of calibrated liberalisation espoused 
earlier in this chapter, as well as other strategies of calibrated coercion (George, 
2012), calibrated secularism (Abdullah, 2013),  muscular secularism, and liberal 
secularism as co-optative strategies (Ramakrishna, 2010), we can visualise the 
spectrum of control that encompasses these various theoretical strategies as 
follows:146  
 
Figure 2(Source; Author) 
In other words, these various theoretical strategies of coercion, co-
optation and liberalisation all exist at separate points on a single spectrum of 
control, enabling us to clearly understand the scope and extent of the 
Leviathan’s capacity for control. This dissertation, by offering a theory of 
calibrated liberalisation, has expanded on the current literature by contending 
that a strategic, calibrated strategy of liberalisation can function as a distinctive 
and effective strategy of control, albeit in tandem with other strategies of 
control.  
                                                 
146 It is noteworthy that Ramakrishna (2010) did not offer muscular and liberal secularism as 
strategies of co-optation. The notion that they functioned as co-optative strategies comes 
from Abdullah (2013) who used it to frame his theory of calibrated secularism while discussing 
co-optative strategies of the Singapore state towards religion. 
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Indeed, this dissertation attempts to advance the current understanding 
of the Leviathan’s calibrated approach towards political control and hegemony 
by suggesting that the state does not necessarily approach an issue or case of 
organised dissent with a singular strategy of calibrated coercion or calibrated 
liberalisation. Instead, given the spectrum of control available to the Leviathan, 
it frequently fashions a calibrated strategy that adopts elements of calibrated 
coercion, liberalisation and co-optation to varying levels, depending on the 
issue.  
In the following chapter, we will be examining three protest movements 
in Singapore, the NLB saga (2014), the CPF protests (2013) and the Thaipusam 
protest movement (2015) to examine the Leviathan’s use of calibrated 
liberalisation as part of a wider strategy of control. Using the concept of a 
spectrum of control, it is argued that government strategy towards these protest 
movements may be put into the form of a table, as below:  
 








3.10 Concluding Thoughts 
A calibrated approach to liberalisation, I have argued, is increasingly becoming 
an important strategy in the arsenal of the Leviathan as it faces new challenges 
and constraints in negotiating its hegemony and maintaining political control. It 
has also been further contended that while a calibrated approach to liberalisation 
as a strategy of political control is increasingly both necessary and functional, a 
new framework which perceives calibration on dual levels with various 
calibrated strategies used in tandem in various levels as suits the issue at hand 
is necessary to better understand the Leviathan’s sophisticated approach 
towards political control.  
This new framework allows for a more comprehensive range of 
strategical perspectives, which I have termed as existing on a ‘spectrum of 
control’. In the chapters that follow, I will critically examine both the role of 
calibrated liberalisation as a singular strategy and its place on a more expansive 
calibrated strategy encompassing various levels of coercion, co-optation and 













The NLB Saga: Of Penguins, Books and Rights 
 
 
4.1 Initial Dissent, a Firm Stance and a Coercive Response 
On 8 July 2014, a Facebook post by Teo Kai Loon, in the Facebook group “We 
are Against Pinkdot in Sinagapore,” began to go viral. In his post, Teo shared 
email correspondence with the National Library Board (NLB) in which the NLB 
had acceded to his request to remove two children’s books from its shelves 
because they had been adjudged insufficiently ‘pro-family’ (see fig. 4).147  
 
Figure 4 (Source; Facebook) 
                                                 
147 The first book, ‘Tango Makes Three’ was based around a true story of two male penguins 
acting as a couple hatching and raising a baby penguin. The second book ‘The White Swan 
Express’ revolved around the idea of adoption and portrayed a single mother and a lesbian 
couple as key characters in the book.  
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By 9 July, the post had created a huge furore online and was reported in 
most major news platforms. In his post, Teo exhorted his likeminded group 
mates to “continue to scrutinize the catalogue,” reminding them that the NLB’s 
response was proof that they were “empowered to make a difference.”148 It was 
further revealed that the NLB had previously removed a third book titled 
‘Who’s in My Family? All About Our Family.’149 Although all three titles did 
not overtly promote same-sex, bisexual, or transsexual lifestyles, they were 
deemed to suggest that these lifestyles were acceptable, and as such were out of 
line with traditional family values. When contacted by the press, the NLB 
defended their actions by saying that:  
Young children are among our libraries’ most frequent visitors. 
Many of them browse books in our children’s sections on their 
own. As such, NLB takes a pro-family and cautious approach in 
identifying titles for our young visitors.150  
The NLB’s decision attracted widespread criticism from civil society 
activists and groups. Ms Jolene Tan, Programmes and Communications senior 
manager at the Association of Women for Action and Research criticized the 
decision, noting that “it is good for children to know that many different types 
of families exist, not just the one idealised family type of one man and one 
woman.”151 She also contended that “being pro-family also means 
understanding that many family types do exist — from single-parent families to 
                                                 
148 “National Library Board apparently banned two children’s books as they are deemed not 
pro-family”, Mothership.sg, July 8, 2014, http://mothership.sg/2014/07/national-library-
board-apparently-banned-two-childrens-books-as-they-are-deemed-not-pro-family/ 
149 This book is premised around a Family’s trip to the zoo and focuses on the inherent diversity 
of families. It references alternative family structures, including single parent and same-sex 
families. 
150 “NLB pulls two children’s books that ‘don’t promote family values’”, Today Newspaper, 




same-sex couples.”152 Noted LGBT activist Vincent Wijeysingha called the 
case a “really serious matter of public censorship.”  
Many other critics asked whether the NLB had acted on the extreme 
demands of a fringe group and even if conservative religious sentiments had 
infiltrated the public institutions such as the NLB. Other groups such as the 
above-mentioned “We are Against Pinkdot in Sinagapore” and “Singaporeans 
United for Family” rallied in support for the NLB’s decision, writing a letter 
praising the intention to protect the sanctity of traditional families.153 NLB’s 
decision was also supported by the Minister for Communications and 
Information Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, who affirmed in a lengthy Facebook post that:  
NLB’s decision was guided by community norms. Public 
libraries serve the community and it is right that they give 
consideration to community norms. The prevailing norms, which 
the overwhelming majority of Singaporeans accept, support 
teaching children about conventional families, but not about 
alternative, non-traditional families, which is what the books in 
question are about. This approach is shared between all public 
agencies dealing with the education and care of young 
Singaporeans. 
NLB declared on 11 July that despite the uproar, the books would not 
be reinstated. Instead they announced that the books would be pulped in 
accordance with library policy. The library also decided that despite offers to 
buy the books, they would “not be resold or donated as usually happens with 
                                                 
152 “NLB pulls two children’s books that ‘don’t promote family values’.”, Today Newspaper, 
July 9, 2014. 
153 Tay Ek Kiat, “The Year in Review: Policy and Political Developments in 2014,” Institute of 
Policy Studies (2015):12. 
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discarded books, because of concern that they might be unsuitable for young 
children.”154  
The NLB’s initial response to the backlash it received was a firm and 
mildly coercive one. Having received official support from the Minister for 
Communication and Information, The NLB not only stuck to its initial decision 
to withdraw the books, it announced its decision to pulp the books, choosing 
policy guidelines over public sensitivity. The NLB’s decision was a show of 
authority and a coercive response to the backlash it had received.155  
4.2 Increased Backlash and the State Steps Back 
The NLB’s decision to pulp the books however merely worsened the backlash, 
as more public intellectuals, writers, and members of the public began to voice 
their disapproval. Many luminaries in literary circles also began to boycott 
NLB-hosted and sponsored events. Playwright Ovidia Yu stepped down from 
the steering committee of the Singapore Writers Festival, partly organised by 
the NLB, while other writers like Dr Gwee Li Sui, Dr Adrian Tan, Mr Felix 
Cheong and Mr Prem Anand boycotted a previous agreement to be part of an 
NLB panel discussion, leading to the event’s cancellation.156 Furthermore, 
“three judges of the Singapore Literature Prize resigned from their positions, 
releasing a strongly-worded statement condemning both the hasty removal of 
the books and the intended pulping.”157 
                                                 
154 NLB saddened by Criticism. But it is not changing decision to remove three ‘unsuitable’ 
children’s books: CEO.”, The Sunday Times, July 13, 2014. 
155 Interview with protest participant, 28 October 2015. 
156 “NLB’s decision to withdraw books based on ‘community norms’: Yaacob.”, TODAY 
Newspaper, 12 July 2014. 
157 Tay, The Year in Review,12. 
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The anger amongst literary society manifested itself most profoundly in 
a ‘novel protest’ on July 13, 2014, for which approximately “400 people showed 
up to make a ‘peaceful statement’ by making the withdrawn books available for 
the public to read.”158 The organisers, writer Jolene Tan, 31, and Ms Germaine 
Ong, 30 organised the protest through Ong’s Facebook group, Singapore's 
Parents Against Library Censorship, which had been set up to express 
disagreement with the library's decision to remove the titles.  
The protest was noteworthy for several reasons. Firstly, it was couched 
in family-centric terms, with its principal organisers keen to point out that as 
two mothers of young children, they had no interest in pursuing anything that 
could potentially lead to unrest.159 The protest itself was organised around the 
idea of bringing children together to read peacefully in a library-like fashion. 
Jolene Tan noted that:  
We wanted make a “peaceful statement” and highlight what we 
find to be important and valuable in children’s literature, such as 
understanding people with different experiences and 
circumstances. We think that some of the books that have been 
withdrawn from the library are among the books that we think 
are useful for this purpose…Since they are no longer available 
here, we thought it would be nice to have an event where we 
make them available to those people who would want to come 
and read them.160  
The protest was also notable for its venue, the National Library Building 
atrium, making it the only organised protest since independence which received 
                                                 
158 “A novel protest gets read out at the library.” My Paper, July 14, 2014 
159 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015 
160 “Hundreds gather to make ‘peaceful statement’ about removal of books.” Today 
Newspaper, July 14, 2014. 
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permission to occur outside Hong Lim Park. The organisers have also 
highlighted that permission was given very willingly, with the police even 
contacting the organisers and informing them that a permit was necessary and 
indicating their willingness to expedite the process.161 The police also directed 
the organisers towards key personnel within the NLB who would be able to give 
them permission to hold the event within their premises. Interviews with the 
organisers have revealed that NLB staff were “really supportive” and 
accommodating towards the protest, offering the premises as well as any help 
that was requested.162  
The protest itself took place in precisely the manner prescribed by its 
organisers. There were no speeches or slogan shouting, placards decrying NLB 
or the government. The event, as the name “Lets Read Together” suggests, 
focused on showcasing parents’ willingness to read these allegedly contentious 
books to their children. The protestors set up a small library-like corner in the 
atrium for a couple of hours where others who attended the event could borrow 
books that were brought by fellow protestors. Stuffed penguin toys, symbolizing 
the “Tango Makes Three” book, were brought along and displayed prominently 
along with the banned books themselves. The event was marked by the presence 
of prominent civil society activists and member of the local arts and literary 
scene and was heavily covered by local press, giving it a high level of publicity.  
Meanwhile the debate raged on online, with many sympathisers 
changing their Facebook profile pictures to a picture of three penguins with a 
caption saying ‘Free my library’ (fig. 5). As mentioned above, both camps 
                                                 
161 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015. 
162 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015. 
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organised themselves through various Facebook groups and opinions were 
widely shared through Facebook status posts and blog articles. The Straits 
Times noted that this issue had attracted the highest number of letters of any 
topic in 2014, making it the most hotly debated question in the public sphere.163 
  
Figure 5 (Source; Facebook) 
There also seemed to be a difference of opinion within the leadership of 
the Leviathan itself. While Minister Yaacob Ibrahim and Deputy Prime Minister 
Teo Chee Hean came out in support of the NLB’s decision, other PAP leaders 
seemed to disagree with it. Most notably, Hri Kumar MP, in a Facebook note 
titled “Pulped Friction,” expressed his dissatisfaction with the current 
decision.164 Hri Kumar’s open disagreement with NLB policy, especially after 
it had been openly supported by key leaders, was a definite shift away from the 
norm. Very rarely does the political leadership allow for a show of a difference 
of opinion within the ruling elite. Hri Kumar’s open disagreement with the 
                                                 
163 “It's about who decides what's right or wrong.” The Sunday Times, Jul 20, 2014. 




NLB’s decision along with the observations we have made above thus suggests 
certain conclusions.  
The state’s willingness to allow open debate on the issue suggests that it 
does not consider the issue to be a politically sensitive one that could potentially 
destabilize its legitimacy.165 Any issue of reasonable importance to the state 
would not be publicly debated within the ruling party, although it must be noted 
that even an ‘unimportant’ one being debated represents a significant shift in 
itself.166 
The view that the presence of opposing views was not seen as opposition 
to the core interests of the Leviathan is also supported by the fact that the robust 
debate in the public sphere, both online and the mainstream media, went 
virtually unmolested. The state made no concerted effort to either stifle the 
conversation with thinly veiled threats, or to co-opt the conversation through 
official channels and its extensive grassroots networks (strategies we will 
observe in the other case studies later). When individual leaders within the 
Leviathan did emerge to offer an opinion, it was neither domineering nor 
homogenous. In short, there seemed to be no attempt to use calibrated coercive 
and co-optative strategies.  
Rather, there was a strategy of calibrated liberalisation at work. The 
Leviathan had stepped back, and allowed for a contentious debate without its 
                                                 
165 For an academic understanding of the State’s evolving approach towards LGBT issues, see 
Chong, Compensating, 2011, and Lynette Chua, Mobilizing Gay Singapore (2014) 26–44. 
166 There are a few instances of disagreements between PAP leaders becoming public. The 
building of casinos in Singapore divided the PAP on moral grounds with Lee Kuan Yew being 
notably against it. This suggest the PAP is more willing to debate issues of public morality, 
although it could just as easily be argued the PAP was merely co-opting and staging the 
disagreements within the public sphere to expedite the process of sanctioning the casinos. 
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pronounced presence. It allowed an organised protest outside Hong Lim Park 
for the first time since independence. Although protestors had to have a 
conversation with the police and apply for a permit, they were treated cordially 
by both the police and the NLB officials. Organisers of the protest expressed 
surprise that they had received the permit and highlighted that they were clearly 
aware that at every point permission was likely to be denied.  
The decision to allow an active discussion without state intrusion also 
allowed the Leviathan to adopt the more powerful position of adjudicator 
instead of having to police the debate. As the debate went on without reaching 
a consensus, both sides petitioned the state to step in and decide the issue in 
their favour. There were also increased calls from more neutral observers to the 
state to find consensus and deliver a judgement that would satisfy both sides 
sufficiently for the heated arguments to subside. Cherian George astutely noted 
that this was reflective of a citizenry that for decades had “enjoyed the dubious 
privilege of turning to a nanny state whenever one feels offended.”167 Needless 
to say, being invited to the table to deliver a judgement was the best-case 
scenario and an offer the Leviathan simply could not refuse.  
4.3 Judgement Delivered: A Calibrated decision befitting a Calibrated 
Strategy 
The issue finally found a modicum of resolution on 18 July, when Dr Yaacob, 
in a slight reversal of his initial stance, announced that he had instructed the 
library to return two of the three banned titles to the library shelves. The third, 
                                                 





“Who’s in My Family” had already been pulped. Dr Yaacob however stood by 
the NLB’s decision to remove the books from the children’s section and 
defended their right to “decide what books should be made readily available to 
children.” The restored books would be placed in the adult section instead.168  
Dr Yaacob also instructed the library to review its policy and processes for 
dealing with books that receive public criticism and feedback.169  
The move was conciliatory towards both sides of the debate and seemed 
focused on finding a compromise. NLB’s CEO, Elaine Law took a similarly 
conciliatory stance by noting that “one of the things we could improve is that 
we could seek more voices and find ways for external processes to feed into our 
decisions,” accepting that there was a need for greater engagement before 
making decisions that limit readers access to books based on notions of moral 
policing.170 She also seemed to accept that the NLB did bear some blame for 
the uproar by confessing that choosing to pulp the books despite the public 
outcry was “something we could have thought deeper about” and that “the 
processes we have in place for reviewing feedback about our books must 
improve.”171 
The general, albeit grudging, public consensus was that this was “a 
reasonable move of compromise” given that neither camp was willing to give 
in to resolve the issue.172 Academics took a similar perspective. Cherian George 
                                                 
168 Yaacob Ibrahim, Facebook post, accessed May 8, 
2015,https://www.facebook.com/yaacobibrahim/posts/800605309973979. 
169 Ibid., 
170 “NLB to evaluate its processes for reviewing feedback on books.” TODAY Newspaper, July 
19, 2014.  
171 “NLB may involve external voices in review process,” The Straits Times, July 19, 2014. See 
also, “Two removed children's books will go into adult section at library,” The Straits Times, 
July 19, 2014. 
172 “Latest move by NLB welcomed – and criticised,” The Straits Times, July 19, 2014. 
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referred to the decision as a “passable compromise” and a more refined stance 
than the initial position taken by the state.173 Eugene Tan declared that the 
Minister’s decision displayed the Ministry was “responsive to public feedback” 
while being “sensitive and nuanced…in what has been an unnecessarily divisive 
issue.”174 The general consensus was that while the jury was out on which side 
had won, the referee had done a really good job.  
4.4 Reflecting on State Strategy towards the NLB Protests 
The state’s strategy towards organised protest and dissent is a calibrated one, 
often with various strategies used in tandem. In the case of the NLB protests, it 
favoured calibrated liberalisation, with no use of coercive or co-optative 
strategies. The first level of analysis in dissecting state strategy, however, is to 
reflect on the conditions that make such a strategy possible. We mentioned in 
chapter 3 that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation would be abandoned in the 
presence of two particular ‘red flag’ issues.175 In the case of the NLB saga, both 
these issues were absent.  
Firstly, protestors were not making accusations about the integrity of 
key political leaders in the ruling party. The protests were not directed at the 
government, but on a decision made by the NLB, not a key facet of the 
Leviathan. Secondly, the protests also did not directly involve issues of race and 
religion and did not make accusations against any particular faith or race or 
against the state’s treatment of any particular race or faith. The protests were 
also not championed by any particular religious faith or institution.  
                                                 
173 George, blog post on “Moral Censorship.” 
174 “Latest move by NLB welcomed – and criticised.” 
175 Refer to Chapter 3, Section 7.  
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However, given the state’s ultra-sensitivity towards issues of race and 
religion, it may still have been of some concern to the state that the ‘pro-family’ 
online groups that had supported the NLB’s decision were largely driven by 
conservative religious sections of society. The state’s concern to maintain a 
balance between understanding the concerns of conservative religious groups 
while maintaining the state’s stand of secularism in the public sphere may have 
been a key factor in the eventual decision for the Minister for Communications 
and Information to intervene directly and make a decision for the NLB.  
It was also noted above that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation adjusts 
the level of liberalisation according to the threat perceived by the Leviathan. 
The threat level is largely dependent on the key individuals and groups involved 
as well as the key issues that the protest movement purports to address. The 
NLB saga in this context was relatively low-risk. The protest revolved around 
LGBT issues and the disaffection from arts and literary enthusiasts over the act 
of pulping books. Both Facebook groups and protestors who turned up at the 
NLB library atrium were not focused on criticizing the state at large. Many 
online posts on Facebook and letters to editors in mainstream news platforms 
criticizing the NLB’s decision in fact took pains to point out that the NLB had 
a fantastic track record in terms of service provision.176 Protestors were thus 
focused on getting the NLB to be more transparent with its review process and 
to retract its decision to ban the books, and worse, pulp them.  
Similarly, the key personnel involved were non-threatening to the 
Leviathan. There were no organisers with close connections with opposition 
                                                 
176 “Books helped reader feel accepted“, The Straits Times, ST Forum, July 10, 2014. 
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parties. Furthermore, the protests were framed as a peaceful gathering organised 
by parents to read the books that had been taken from the shelf to children show 
both support for the cause of reinstating the books. The protests were also not 
organised by any particular advocacy group, NGO or civil society organisation. 
Although Jolene Tan, one of the two principal organisers, was a full time 
employee of the Association of Women for Action & Research (AWARE), an 
active NGO and advocacy group, AWARE played no official or visible role in 
organising the protests.177 Interviews with participants and organisers also 
highlighted that organisers took pains to highlight their status as “ordinary 
bourgeois lad(ies) who carry handbag” with little interest in radically changing 
society. With such narrow and non-threatening aims and given the absence of 
key personnel with strong socio-political agendas, the NLB protest was in many 
senses primed for a strategy of calibrated liberalisation.  
An analysis of the NLB protest also shows how a calibrated strategy of 
control by the Leviathan is often a reactive one, as suggested in Chapter 3. As 
we have observed above, the NLB’s initial reaction to the furore was to stand 
its ground very firmly. The NLB’s stance was also strongly echoed by the 
Minister for Communications and Information. What defines state strategy with 
regards to the NLB protest however, was the lack of any coercive actions or 
even words, in an attempt to stifle or silence dissent.178  
                                                 
177 Interview with Corinna Lim, Executive Director – AWARE, dated October 29, 2015. It was 
also pointed out by Corinna that while AWARE consciously pushes boundaries and raises 
contentious issues, it also works closely with the State and has worked closely with high 
ranking civil servants and Ministers to further its causes. The presence of AWARE thus presents 
little threat to the Leviathan.  
178 We will observe in our analysis of other protest movements later, that the lack of coercive 




Rather, after the Minister’s initial strong words of support, the state 
stepped back and allowed an active debate. The public sphere, especially in 
cyberspace and in mainstream media, was for the ten days the saga lasted, 
dominated by the public, with both sides locked in a heated, spirited debate. The 
NLB and the Leviathan even allowed a protest within the NLB premises itself, 
surprising the organisers themselves.179  
The Minister’s eventual decision to reinstate the books, albeit in the 
adult section, was also essentially reactive, both in terms of responding to the 
robust debate which had raged in the ten days past, and in terms of being a 
decision that gave an indication that the debate, and public opinion had been 
heard. It indicated that the voices of average citizens when voiced in unison 
were heard and that there had been a liberalisation of the public sphere. The 
perception of liberalisation, as we have noted above, is often as important as the 
liberalised space in itself.180  
The NLB saga also sheds light on the benefits of such a strategy for the 
Leviathan. Interviews with the participants all described it as a positive 
experience in which progress was made. One participant noted that the 
experience of protesting at NLB premises against NLB was: 
Very powerful and very empowering. I think everybody who 
came for NLB event, went away saying this was so great. It was 
a good time and made us feel empowered. I think it is 
important.181  
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The protests thus made participants feel that their opinions were being 
heard and responded to. Participants in the NLB protests were more convinced 
that a level of liberalisation had occurred in the last few years than participants 
from the CPF protests and the Thaipusam protests.  
It also seems likely that the protests and the robust discussions in the 
public sphere functioned as an unfiltered feedback channel to the Leviathan, 
providing it with a more accurate depiction of public sentiment, thereby 
allowing it to find a compromise acceptable to both sides.  
4.5 Concluding Thoughts on the NLB Saga 
In the case of the NLB saga, the Leviathan adopted a calibrated strategy heavily 
dominated by a calibrated liberalisation approach, with very minimal use of 
coercive or co-optative strategies. As we have hypothesized earlier, it embraced 
such a strategy in a reactive manner, responding to increasingly vociferous 
responses from the public sphere. The lack of red flag issues also meant that the 
NLB protest was a good candidate for a strategy of calibrated liberalisation. 
Finally the decision in favour of a calibrated liberalisation approach has also 
offered shown the benefits of such a strategy for the Leviathan. In conclusion it 
may thus be noted that the state’s strategy towards the NLB saga may be 
understood as such:  
 






Thaipusam 2015: Of Drums, Laws and Privilege 
 
 
5.1 Thaipusam and the Ban on Musical Instruments 
Thaipusam is one of the oldest Hindu festivals celebrated in Singapore at a scale 
that is publicly performative.182 The festival is celebrated by a 3km religious 
procession by devotees carrying paalkudams (milk pots) and Kavadis from 
Srinivasa Perumal Temple at Serangoon Road to Thandayuthapani Temple at 
Tank Road. It is organised by the committees of the two temples under the 
guidance of the Hindu Endowment Board (HEB).  
The Thaipusam festival and other Hindu festivals such as Thimithi and 
Panguni Uthram are “unique from the point of view of laws that regulate 
religious processions in Singapore” where religious foot processions have not 
been permissible by law since 1973.183 1973 was also the year that the 
government “enacted a ban on music in all religious processions” without 
exempting Thaipusam and the other Hindu festivals.184 The ban on musical 
instruments was justified in 1973 by the then-Minister for Home Affairs, Mr 
Chua Sian Chin on the grounds of the ensuing traffic disruption and congestion 
caused by devotees dancing to the beat of the music.185 The ban over the years 
has been justified on other grounds, including a “history of rivalry and fights 
between competing groups that disrupted the procession” and the slowed pace 
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due to musical instruments “sometimes causing friction between participants, 
which in turn could lead to public order issues and disruption to other members 
of public.”186 Government sensitivity regarding religious processions were 
justified based on the racial riots of 1964, when a peaceful religious procession 
ended in a bloody riot between Malays and Chinese.187 Despite the 
government’s sincere concerns over sensitivities, the ban “continues to be 
criticized and has remained controversial.”188 
The ban on musical instruments has also been contested several times 
since 1973. Sinha (2011) highlights that although the HEB is often blamed by 
angry devotees for colluding with the government, it has “on several occasions 
appealed to the relevant authorities to lift the ban on music during the 
procession,” albeit without success.189 Sykes (2015) however contends that the 
HEB has supported enforcing the ban, particularly because of concerns that 
“youths had been turning Thaipusam into a ‘comic opera’ and ‘carnival’.”190 
The ban has come to be seen as a form of moral policing and a sanitization of 
the festival leading to a loss of ritual and religious significance.  
5.2 Arrests, Groundswell, Mobilisation and Protests 
The arrest of three devotees, Ramachandra Chandramohan, Jaya Kumar 
Krishnasamy and Gunasegaran Rajendran on 3 February 2015, during the 
Thaipusam festival after a scuffle with the Singapore Police Force (SPF) caused 
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a huge uproar online, triggering allegations of police brutality, religious 
discrimination and a wave of sympathy for the arrestees. The incident that led 
to the arrest has been heavily disputed by both the SPF and the group of devotees 
involved in the scuffle. Figure 7 shows the SPF’s reported version of the 
incident. 191 
 
Figure 7 (Source; Facebook) 
                                                 




In a long Facebook post, however, Ramachandra Chandramohan gave 
his version of the events. He confirmed that the issue between his group of 
devotees and the SPF revolved around the ban on musical instruments. He 
however claimed that because the police officers were not in uniform, it was 
impossible for them to have known they were being aggressively accosted by 
the police.192  
Mr Chandramohan also disputed police allegations that he and his 
compatriots had been drinking. He claimed to be a teetotaller and criticized the 
police for making unfounded allegations and the mainstream media for 
publishing falsehoods. Mr Chandramohan further accused the police of using 
excessive force, particularly toward, his sister-in-law.193 A video of the incident 
circulated online seemingly showed the police using force to quell a dispute and 
a woman being pulled to the ground. The woman involved in the altercation 
also made a police report alleging that she had been assaulted by the police.194  
The allegations of excessive force are very significant because it seems 
to have had a profound effect on the extent of the groundswell of support for 
the Thaipusam protests. All the protestors who were interviewed pointed to 
police violence against devotees as the trigger factor that motivated them to act. 
The issue was simplified and framed on social media in a manner that suggested 
that the police had used violence against devotees who had dared to question 
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them over an unjust rule that prevented them from expressing their right to 
religious freedom. An interviewee noted that:  
I was deeply saddened by the incident that happened during 
Thaipusam. Police mishandled the devotees…There was a fight 
and dispute and the Police weren’t in uniform. They used 
extreme force to pin them down…and mishandled the situation. 
This provoked me as a Hindu and a Tamilian. I couldn’t accept 
it. This is my culture and an important festival so why can’t we 
play the instruments? I was very taken aback. I couldn’t sleep for 
3 days.195 
All parties agree however is that the disagreement was provoked by the 
ban of musical instruments at the Thaipusam festival. The arrest of the three 
devotees triggered off long aggrieved sensibilities within sections of the Hindu 
community regarding the ban on musical instruments during Thaipusam, with 
the video of the altercation going viral on social media platforms. By the very 
next day, two Facebook pages had been set up to mobilize protest against the 
incident. The first page was set up by a group called ‘Voices of One’ titled 
‘Speak Up For Singapore Thaipusam’ (SUFST).196 The second page was titled 
‘Voices of Singaporean Indians’ (VOSI).197 In the page description section the 
SUFST page claims that “we want answers from HEB on the musical instrument 
banned in Thaipusam and request meetings with all the organizations involved 
in Thaipusam.”198 The VOST page description page suggests a broader goal, 
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claiming that it wanted to rectify problems encountered by the Singapore 
Hindu/Indian community. 199 
Interviews with the key personnel from both groups suggest that the 
focus of both groups was very much on Thaipusam and triggered a serious 
debate on the ban on musical instruments as well as allegations of police 
brutalit.  The SUFST page had generated more than 9000 likes and the VOST 
page had generated more than 3000 likes at the time of this research.200  
5.3 Calls for a Public Holiday and a Protest Rally 
The discussions also unearthed a long dormant discussion about Thaipusam 
being a public holiday which it had been until 1968, when it was abolished under 
the Holidays (Amendment) Bill.201 The plea to make it a public holiday again 
had resurfaced multiple times in previous years and it found newfound 
resonance in the wake of the arrests. Sangeetha Thanapal, a vocal activist on 
issues of race, posted a Facebook note titled ‘Thaipusam & the right to cultural 
and religious expression in Singapore’ in which she raised the issue of making 
Thaipusam a public holiday as well as the ban on musical instruments during 
the procession.202 The note was very strongly worded and made serious 
allegations about the status of the Indian community in Singapore. Ms Thanapal 
alleged that the current state of affairs was indicative of “institutionalized 
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racism” in which the state showed a “cavalier disregard” for an “ethnic minority 
that was already numerically vulnerable” and that it treated “Indians as less 
important.”203 Sangeetha’s note was shared by both Facebook pages and many 
alternative news sites and blogs online, including The Online Citizen.204 Her 
grievances also manifested itself in an online petition titled “Make Thaipusam 
a religious holiday in Singapore” which was addressed to Mdm Halimah Yacob, 
Chairman of the Public Petitions Committee, Parliament of Singapore.205  
The response to the petition, by Singapore standards, was astounding. It 
received 10,000 signatures in a single day and in two months managed to garner 
more than 20,000 signatures in total. It was a strong show of public support for 
the cause. Another online petition focused on the ban against musical instrument 
titled “Allow urumi mellam and thavil to be played for Thaipusam,” started by 
Mr Subramaniam Arumugam gathered 4600 signatures.206  
The popularity of Ms Thanapal’s petition and the widespread support it 
received attracted the attention of other activists in Singapore. Mr Gilbert Goh, 
a well-known activist organised a protest rally on 14th February. According to 
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key personnel involved in the planning of the protest, around two to three 
thousand people had expressed interest in attending the protests on Facebook.  
5.4 The Leviathan Strikes Back – Calibrated Coercion 
The Leviathan’s response to the groundswell of public protest and disaffection 
was decidedly dominated by the use of calibrated coercion as espoused by 
George (2012) of which a key characteristic is the fine-tuning of coercive 
strategies with the active use of self-restraint for the purpose of maximising the 
effectiveness of control at minimum political cost.207 The state’s calibrated 
coercive strategy was tempered with low levels of calibrated liberalisation and 
co-optation so as to minimize political cost.  
Coercion was employed strategically at different levels towards 
different facets of dissent. The strongest level of coercion was reserved for the 
three men who were involved in the altercation with the SPF. All three were 
charged with disorderly behaviour and face multiple charges. Of the three, 
Ramachandra Chandramohan faces the highest number of charges. He was 
alleged to have “punched, kicked and verbally abused four police officers.”208 
If found guilty of physically abusing the officers, he faces the prospect of caning 
along with a jail term.209 The charges, with no sign of leniency, is very much in 
line with the Leviathan’s low tolerance for breaches in law and order, let alone 
skirmishes with the police. The Leviathan was not moved by the groundswell 
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of sympathy for the three men and chose to make an example of them to anyone 
who would consider in any circumstances a similar course of action.  
The state’s strategy towards addressing the mobilization of protest both 
online and the planned organized protest rally at Hong Lim Park was more 
nuanced. The state first embarked on a series of indirect and thinly veiled threats 
which were focused on highlighting the sensitivity of the issues being addressed 
and the possibility of strong state action as well as the potential for racial and 
religious tensions. Minister of Law, K. Shanmugam responded to the issues 
raised by highlighting that “Hindus should not feel they are being discriminated 
against just because musical instruments are not allowed during Thaipusam” 
because “they are the only ones here allowed to hold not just one but three 
religious processions.”210 No other religion, he noted, “is given this 
privilege.”211 His comments were echoed by then-Second Home Affairs 
Minister S.Iswaran who noted that the “longstanding ban on playing 
instruments during such processions had been in place as a result of past 
instances of fights between competing groups of musicians, and disruption to 
the procession and to devotees.”212  
The rhetoric employed by the two ministers must be examined critically 
as they focus on two specific ideas. The first was that there were clear laws 
forbidding religious processions. The celebration of Thaipusam, in whichever 
form it was allowed was hence a “privilege,” which unlike a ‘right’ could be 
easily confiscated by a less munificent state. The second idea, revolves around 
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the vulnerability of the state, and the need for strong laws and governance to 
mitigate its existential vulnerability. In its response, the state referred to the riots 
of 1964 and previous instances of skirmishes, and the need for religion to be 
handled carefully. The rhetoric is highly paternalistic, combining the tendencies 
of parents to be both stern and concerned about the well-being of a naughty 
child. 
This strategy of responding with a paternalistic voice, tempering 
coercive threats with a tone of concern due to existential vulnerabilities was 
adopted by both the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Attorney General 
Chambers (AGC). MHA in its press release on the Thaipusam procession on 13 
February echoed both Ministers by highlighting that:  
MHA's general approach to events is to strike a balance between 
facilitating the activity while ensuring public safety and law and 
order. Religious foot processions pose a higher risk to public 
order…Emotions can be easily aroused when religious 
sensitivities are offended, which can trigger disorder and even 
violence. A general ban on religious foot processions was 
imposed following the racial riots in 1964, which had started as 
a peaceful procession but ended with the loss of lives…The 
reactions to the incident in this year's Thaipusam show that race 
and religion continue to be sensitive issues.213 
MHA further noted that the Thaipusam procession was an “exception” that had 
been made for the Hindu community. They also highlighted that:  
There have also been misrepresentations and rumours online and 
offline regarding the Thaipusam procession. If such activities are 
deemed to incite enmity between different communities and 
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races, the Police will investigate and take firm action against 
anyone responsible for such offences. Singaporeans should 
reject such actions and never allow them to take root in our 
society.214 
The emphasis once again seems to be focused on a cocktail of implicit 
and indirect threats and a constant re-emphasis of the fragile vulnerabilities 
inherent within Singapore. The AGC echoed MHA’s warning about the online 
discourse by reminding the public “to refrain from making comments regarding 
three Singaporean men charged with offences allegedly committed during a 
Thaipusam procession.”215 An AGC spokesman noted that doing so “may be 
sub judice contempt of court” and the public “was advised to refrain from 
making any public comments, or posting any statements on the Internet on these 
matters.” The vague nature of both the MHA and AGC’s warnings made any 
conversation about issues surrounding Thaipusam in 2015 problematic. 
Within a span of a week, two senior party leaders, and the responsible 
arms of government had issued statements echoing one another. Within the 
context of Singapore’s political culture, driven by an inherent insecurity in the 
perpetual gaze of a paternalistic state and a culture of auto-regulation, the effect 
of constantly re-affirmed, thinly veiled threats cannot be underestimated.  
Perhaps as a final nail into the proverbial coffin, the SPF rejected Gilbert 
Goh's application for a permit which was essential for organising events 
involving race and religion.216 The Police declared that the application was 
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rejected because the event "runs a significant risk of public disorder and could 
incite feelings of hostility between different racial and religious groups in 
Singapore."217 In its rejection, the SPF affirmed that while the "The Speakers' 
Corner is a public space where Singaporeans can speak outdoors in public on 
any issue,” that privilege did not extend to “matters related to religion…which 
may cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different racial 
or religious groups in Singapore."218  
The refusal to issue a permit must be seen in context of the political 
climate of Singapore since 2011. The Leviathan had weathered constant 
criticisms of its housing, transport and immigration policies. It had also not 
prevented protest rallies organised in response to the Population White Paper 
and other issues. The firm refusal to even negotiate sent a clear message that the 
Leviathan would not be benign with regards to the Thaipusam issue.  
The overall effect of all the repeated warnings from the Leviathan was 
a chilling one. A key activist involved in the organising of the protest rally 
informed me that the permit was rejected because issues of race and religion 
“were too sensitive” and that he agreed with the police decision. He further 
noted that given the climate at the time, he had become “afraid that there would 
be some ugly scenes” and that he would then “be the one to blame.”219 When 
prodded further about whether he foresaw the rally becoming rowdy, he replied 
that:  
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Yes…because its religion and people are more sensitive. So I 
feel this is getting quite difficult. We had planned 10-20 
bodyguards around the stage if needed. We were afraid it would 
get out of hand and I am actually very relieved that the Police 
didn’t give us the permit…It was a very contentious period and 
things moved very fast. It’s a bit sensitive. Im glad we didn’t get 
involved.220 
The sense of trepidation and the tendency towards auto-regulation in the 
face of issues regarding race and religion was especially striking. It led me to 
query the interviewee why an experienced and seasoned activist like himself 
had so much apprehension with regards to this rally, to which he responded 
tellingly that:  
Im not young…but for people like you I guess you would wish 
that race and religion is part of an open discussion. But now we 
still cant. I grew up in the era of Lee Kuan Yew where race and 
religion is taboo. I wish moving forward we can…Now its still 
deeply segmented.221  
The notion that debating issues of religion and race are deeply taboo, 
and the fear of repercussion from the state, is deeply prevalent even amongst 
seasoned, experienced activists. This chilling effect of the state’s strategy was 
also observable in interviews with protestors closely involved with the two 
Facebook pages. One interviewee, who had helped set up one of the pages, 
noted that constant and consistent statements by key government leaders and 
various government organisations coupled with the police refusal to give a 
permit:  
                                                 




Definitely scared the community. Sometimes people can only sit 
behind a computer screen and ‘like’ things. They dare not come 
in front to speak. They don’t have guts…We are modern 
slaves… The threats and the cancellation of the rally changed the 
mindset of the people. It scared them. They immediately felt it 
was too sensitive to talk about. The music ban also they accepted 
and they just followed along with it. This is the culture of our 
community.222  
The Leviathan’s strategy of calibrated coercion, imposed a ‘chilling 
effect’ on the furore. At the same time, it also began to employ low levels of 
calibrated liberalisation and co-optation, thereby adopting a strategy that was 
more nuanced, and limiting political cost.  
5.5 Limited Liberalisation and Co-optation 
On 11th February 2015, Minister K. Shanmugam, having earlier reminded 
Singaporean Hindus that Thaipusam was a ‘privilege’, appeared to soften his 
stand on the issue. The minister, speaking at MediaCorp Vasantham’s current 
affairs programme Ethiroli (Echo) suggested that while it was only fair that 
Hindus were expected to adhere to expectations that they behave in an orderly 
and peaceful manner, it was also true that music accompaniment “was 
something that we have to look into” and that the HEB would have to consult 
the people.223  
Almost as a response to the Minister, simultaneously, the HEB released 
a statement on the 13th of February professing that the HEB had on multiple 
occasions “represented the community interests by requesting authorities to 
                                                 




adjust the rules to take into consideration the importance of music to our 
religious rites.”224 HEB further stated that it had never lobbied authorities to 
tighten the rules regarding playing of instruments but that it would “engage 
interested members of the community through feedback sessions to gather their 
views.”225 HEB’s decision to conduct feedback sessions was publicized in the 
mainstream media and through government feedback platforms like REACH. 
The public perception thus was that the state had softened its stand and was 
willing to engage in dialogue. 
Interviews with protestors who attended the feedback sessions however 
reveal deep frustrations with the session. Interviewees revealed that the 
feedback sessions were conducted in small groups, preventing different groups 
that the HEB might find contentious to engage them at the same time. The 
groups from the two different Facebook pages for example were not allowed to 
meet with HEB at the same time, although they had requested that they be 
allowed to.226 Furthermore, the feedback sessions ended up being strictly a 
means through which the HEB collected feedback, often responding to 
questions with answers like “noted” without engaging the in a discussion or 
providing answers to questions in any elaborative way. Interviewees also noted 
that the HEB had initially agreed to provide a transcript of the session but had 
since reneged on the agreement. They also expressed dissatisfaction with the 
fact that following the feedback session, HEB had stopped being responsive to 
queries regarding the outcome of the feedback sessions conducted. Interviewees 
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universally agreed that the feedback sessions came across as an insincere 
exercise conducted for the purpose of fooling the community into believing that 
the HEB was engaging and taking concerns of the community seriously and as 
such they seriously doubted the potential for any change. Interestingly, two 
interviewees suggested that if there was indeed any hope for the ban to be 
removed, it lay with key political leaders, whom activists were better off 
lobbying as opposed to the HEB. The Leviathan, in forcing potential dissenters 
to offer feedback within the carefully pruned structures of its official feedback 
system, had co-opted the only form of tangible dialogue that eventually took 
place. The co-opted conversation was limited and beneficial only to the HEB 
which managed to gather the feedback it required while assuaging the concerns 
of the majority of citizens who weren’t active activists that honest feedback had 
taken place.  
Following the forced cancellation of the protests, there have been no 
attempts to stifle conversations on the issue on the blogs or Facebook groups. 
Interviewees noted that the ‘chilling effect’ created by the state’s indirect threats 
and the refusal to issue a permit for the protest rally had meant that the 
conversation had slowed down considerably and was limited to a much smaller 
group of netizens, and there had been no attempt to stifle or muzzle 
conversations within the pages despite many statements clearly contravening 
the AGC’s warnings. The state thus having already employed a strategy of 
calibrated coercion, was now stepping back to allow for discussion in the public 




5.6 Reflecting on State Strategy towards the Thaipusam Protests 
In the case of the Thaipusam protests, the state’s strategy seems to be calibrated 
heavily in favour of a calibrated coercion approach, with very minimal use of 
coercive or co-optative strategies.  It is clear why a strategy favouring calibrated 
liberalisation was not feasible to the state in this instance. The issue raised the 
red flag issue of race and religion. Accusations of racism and religious 
intolerance on the part of the Leviathan were also openly espoused by more 
vocal and contentious elements within the movement. This would naturally 
have led the Leviathan given its ultra-sensitivity towards race and religion to 
view the protest movement as one that was highly threatening, even though the 
movement lacked any potential political threats.  
It is also worth considering briefly, why the state chose to employ a 
strategy dominated by calibrated coercion, despite its potential to be politically 
costly. The first key reason, is that the discourse of vulnerability, especially with 
regards to race and religion is one that permeates even experienced activists and 
protestors. The Leviathan thus has greater latitude in dealing with contentious 
issues regarding race and religion as opposed to other issues.  
Secondly, the Thaipusam festival itself has a contentious place in 
Singaporean history, and is divided along issues of class and caste within the 
Hindu community in Singapore. Although today it is viewed as an 
“unambiguously Hindu festival,” Thaipusam has historically been viewed by 
upper class and upwardly mobile sections of the Hindu community “as 
backward, barbaric, primitive, (and) superstitious.”227 These sections of the 
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community perceived the carrying of spike kavadis and the piercing of flesh that 
accompanies it as “self -mortification,” “self-torture” and “degrading rituals” 
that “opened them up to ridicule from upper class Indians (Non-Tamils), the 
Chinese and the Malays.”228 Sinha (2015) notes that such perceptions continue 
to be “clearly embarrassing to middle-class Hindu sensibilities.”229  
The ban is thus highly contentious within the Indian community because 
there is little agreement within the community as to whether it is for the greater 
good, with perceived notions of class and caste often coming into play, with 
some sections feeling that they are being victimised by other sections’ notions 
of superiority while other groups fear the stigma within greater Singaporean 
society due to an ‘unregulated’ Thaipusam. The lack of cohesion within the 
Hindu community with regards to the festival thus enables a more coercive 
strategy to be employed, with sections of the community lobbying for greater 
regulation and control of the festival.  
5.7 Concluding Thoughts 
Based on the discussions above, it may be concluded that in the case of the 
Thaipusam saga of 2015, the Leviathan evoked a calibrated strategy heavily in 
favour of a calibrated coercion approach, tempered with muted use of 
liberalisation or co-optative strategies. It has been argued that the state used 
coercion in a nuanced fashion, making an example of three publicised dissenters 
and then preferring to use indirect threats to produce a ‘chilling effect’ on other 
protestors. The presence of the red flag issue of race and religion also meant 
                                                 




that the Thaipusam protest was in many senses primed for a strategy dominated 
by calibrated coercion. In conclusion it may thus be noted that the state’s 
strategy towards the Thaipusam saga may be understood as such: 
 










CPF Protests: Of Defamation Suits and Marching Routes 
 
6.1 The CPF Minimum Sum, Roy Ngerng and the Defamation Suit 
On 8 May 2014 the Central Provident Fund (CPF) board and the Ministry of 
Manpower announced that the CPF minimum sum would be raised from 
S$148,000 to S$155,000 from July that year.230 The rise in the minimum sum 
occasioned great frustration among middle and lower income Singaporeans, 
many of whom felt that the amount was being raised to a level they could not 
afford to match, negating their ability to access their funds in a way they would 
prefer.231  
These frustrations manifested themselves in criticisms of the CPF as a 
“money hoarding monster” that had deviated from its original objective of 
providing “subsistence living.”232 Public intellectuals like Devadas Krishnadas 
noted that it was necessary to understand the “angst as reflective of a 
disappointment in the Singapore model” and a need to re-evaluate and 
renegotiate “an outdated social compact.”233 Krishnadas also noted that the 
government’s “well intentioned effort at communicating a complex 
phenomenon that is the CPF model may not have silenced the critics or 
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comforted the anxious.”234 Figure 9 provides an interesting perspective of this 
dissatisfaction and frustration.235  
 
Figure 9 (Source; Facebook) 
It was in these circumstances that blogger-activist Roy Ngerng posted 
an article on his blog, The Heart Truths, regarding the CPF and its perceived 
inadequacies, titled “Where Your CPF Money Is Going: Learning From The 
City Harvest Trial.” In the article, Ngerng drew comparisons between how the 
state managed CPF funds and the City Harvest Church trial which had 
descended into a financial scandal in which church leaders were alleged to have 
misappropriated church funds. His article also included a picture which mapped 
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the alleged relationships between PM Lee, the CPF, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, Temasek Holdings and GIC.236  
On 18 May 2014, the Prime Minister’s lawyers sent Ngerng a letter of 
demand, calling upon him to remove the post from his blog as well as from 
Facebook. PM Lee’s lawyer Davinder Singh contended that the blog post 
suggested that PM Lee “is guilty of criminal misappropriation of the monies 
paid by Singaporeans to the CPF.”237 He further alleged that Ngerng’s blog 
article constituted “serious libel against Mr Lee and disparages him and 
impugns his character, credit and integrity” and that it was “published 
maliciously.”238 The letter warned Ngerng to take down the post by 21 May, 
and to make an offer of damages, failing which a defamation lawsuit would 
proceed.239   
What followed in the next ten days can only best be described as a cat 
and mouse game between Ngerng, PM Lee and their respective legal teams. 
Ngerng first requested an extension till 23 May, which was granted. He then 
removed the article and “apologised unreservedly” to the Prime Minister and 
“acknowledged that the allegation was false and completely without 
foundation.”240 He further requested that the demand for damages be dropped, 
which was rejected by Mr Singh who claimed that the Prime Minister was 
“entitled in law” to be compensated.”241  
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240 Tay, Policy and Political Developments, 25-26. 
241 “Blogger says sorry; PM rejects plea against damages,” The Straits Times, May 24, 2014. 
99 
 
Ngerng responded by uploading a YouTube video in which he reiterated 
his request for the state to be more transparent about CPF funds, which led to a 
new letter of demand and allegations from the Prime Minister’s legal team that 
Ngerng had been not been genuine in his apology. Ngerng then “removed videos 
before deadline and made an offer of S$5000 in damages to PM Lee” which 
was rejected for being a “derisory” offer which disregarded the extent of  
Ngerng’s "calculated and systemic aggravation.”242 PM Lee’s team then 
launched legal action on a defamation suit on 28 May 2014.  
The defamation lawsuit earned Ngerng a groundswell of sympathy.243 
While many felt that his article had been poorly and insensitively worded, it was 
undeniable that he had tapped into strong public resentment towards the CPF. 
The debate in the public sphere regarding the relevance of the CPF and the lack 
of transparency surrounding around it intensified. Ngerng temporarily earned 
‘martyr status’ amongst many agitated Singaporeans who admired his courage 
for speaking up against the government.244 Evidence of the sympathy Ngerng 
aroused came in the form of the response to his  appeal to the public on 29 May 
for help with fighting his legal battle with the Prime Minister, estimating that 
the total legal fees would easily total to S$70,000 at the very least. By 4 June, 
he had amassed S$81,000 in sympathy.245  
It is important to note that Roy was not the only person writing about 
the CPF, or suggesting that the Government had failed to manage it properly. 
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His allegations of government misappropriation directed at the Prime Minister 
meant that he took his allegations further than almost everyone else, but while 
this was significant to the political leadership, it was a nuance that was lost on 
a many Singaporeans, who were thankful that the issue had gotten so much 
publicity. Coercion by a defamation suit was thus seen by many as an attempt 
by the Leviathan to stifle debate over the CPF issue, not just to silence Roy 
Ngerng. The decision to sue Roy for defamation and damages was especially 
coercive because it was the “first defamation suit by a political leader for online 
postings” in Singapore.246 
The Prime Minister’s legal team’s decision to dismiss Ngerng’s offer to 
pay S$5000 in damages as ‘derisory’ also offended many Singaporeans to 
whom that amount of money represented a substantial sum. Ngerng’s argument 
that the amount he offered was based on his “modest living and income” also 
further entrenched an image of persecution in the hearts of many Singaporeans. 
The defamation suit and the perceived persecution of Roy Ngerng was an 
important factor in fanning the flames of the CPF protest movement and a major 
factor in getting people to attend the protest rally that was organised on 7 June 
2014 at Hong Lim Park.   
6.2 The CPF Protest Rally – 7th June 2014 
On 7 June 2015, thousands of Singaporeans attended the “Return Our CPF” 
protest, which called for higher flexibility, increased CPF returns, and greater 
transparency, and agitated against the increase in the CPF Minimum Sum.247 
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Organiser Han Hui Hui claimed that 6,000 people attended the protest, while 
The Straits Times estimated the crowd “was about 2,000” strong.248 While 
Ngerng had initially been one of the organisers, on the advice of his lawyers, he 
withdrew from this position, but chose to remain as a speaker, alongside 
organiser Han Hui Hui, 2011 presidential candidate Tan Kin Lian, ex-Singapore 
Democratic Party (SDP) member Vincent Wijeysingha, Reform Party chief 
Kenneth Jeyaretnam, and statistician Leong Sze Hian. SDP leader Chee Soon 
Juan, who was overseas at the time of the protest and had his speech read by 
blogger Ariffin Sha.  
There are several notable facts about the CPF protest rally. Firstly, at 
2000 people (or 3000), the rally had the highest attendance of any rally after the 
population White Paper protest of 2013. Several interviewees noted that they 
thought the high turnout was driven by the perceived success of the White Paper 
protests. Protestors also perceived large protest rallies as a means to get the 
government’s attention.249 While this alone may not be indicative that a majority 
of Singaporeans were highly concerned about the state of the CPF system, when 
taken together with the defamation suit, the uproar online, and the ferocious 
debate in mainstream and alternative news media outlets, it was clear that this 
issue resonated with the population.  
Secondly, Ngerng was very much at the centre of the rally, both in terms 
of determining the eventual turnout as well as being at the centre of attention. 
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The Straits Times noted that Ngerng received the “loudest cheers from the 
crowd.”250 Other sources noted that many protestors turned up to “express 
displeasure for the lawsuit that the Prime Minister had taken up against him.”251 
Ngerng was given almost celebrity status during the event by the crowd with 
large numbers surrounding him, taking pictures, and even chanting his name 
during his speech.  There can be little doubt that the defamation suit and the 
perceived persecution from the Prime Minister had been interpreted by many as 
a sign of state coercion. 
6.3 The Leviathan Strikes Back – Calibrated Liberalisation and Co-
optation 
The Leviathan’s response to the protest at Hong Lim Park and the furore online 
was a marked departure from its responses to both the NLB and Thaipusam 
sagas. Unlike the Thaipusam case study, the state did not respond coercively to 
allegations of coercion. The protest rally occurred without much state intrusion. 
Sources close to the organisers intimated that they faced no real obstacles from 
the state.252 They were not requested to obtain a police permit, unlike either the 
NLB protests or the Thaipusam protests. Other than last minute cancellations 
from stage contractors and other companies providing support for the event, 
there were virtually no allegations of attempts to stifle the protest by the 
organisers.253  
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There was also no coercion via indirect threats towards online 
discussions and debates, as in the Thaipusam case study. Rather, most major 
alternative news sites online and many socio-political blogs published opinion 
pieces on the issue. Meanwhile, Facebook groups like “Return our CPF,” “In 
Solidarity with Roy Ngerng, The Heart Truths” and “CPF broken promises” all 
provided space within the public sphere for Singaporeans to vent their 
frustrations over the issue.  
Indeed, leaders seemed to increasingly acknowledge a need to debate 
the CPF. In the days and months following the protest rally, there was greater 
engagement from the state. Minister for Manpower Tan Chuan Jin took to 
platforms like Facebook and the Ministry of Manpower’s (MOM) blog to 
defend the CPF system and to explain what he alleged were misconceptions 
with regards to it.254 In his post, the Minister argued that “the CPF system is a 
good and fair one that is a more sustainable system than most other retirement 
schemes... (and) CPF funds are absolutely safe.” He further moved to reassure 
Singaporeans that “the CPF is put in place to help Singaporeans have peace of 
mind when it comes to their retirement years.”255  
PAP MPs also “called for a holistic review of the CPF system in 
Parliament,” an indication that they were acknowledging the saliency of the 
issue.256 MOM subsequently announced “the setting up of a 13 member CPF 
Advisory Panel consisting of academics, financial industry experts and 
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representatives from unions and the grassroots and social sectors” in response 
to the MP’s requests.257 The CPF Advisory Panel, once set up, announced that 
it would meet with Singaporeans in focus group discussions and would 
welcome suggestions in writing before offering its recommendations the 
following year.”258 
The state announced several feedback forums with grassroots leaders 
and PAP MPs and Ministers, facilitated by grassroots organisations. It also 
engaged academics and the intelligentsia through forums organised by think 
tanks like the Institute of Policy Studies.259 PAP MP Hri Kumar held a dialogue 
session with his constituents that allowed for a frank and open exchange with 
the MP on the CPF. The Straits Times noted that “the volley of questions and 
concerns rarely faltered, and most centred on the Minimum Sum, and the 
monthly pay-outs during retirement.”260  
The session attracted some controversy after videos of an emotional 
outburst by an elderly lady who spoke at length of her difficulties with 
withdrawing her money from the CPF, as well as a brief exchange between MP 
Kumar and Reform Party chief Kenneth Jeyaretnam, made its rounds online. 
However the general consensus seemed to indicate that these forums were a 
positive sign that the state was listening to the concerns of the people. This 
opinion gained credence when the Prime Minister spent a significant portion of 
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his annual National Day Rally, seen as the most important political speech of 
the year, discussing the CPF.  
At the rally, the Prime Minister “acknowledged Singaporeans concerns 
and pledged to change parts of the CPF system” while defending the overall 
system as a sensible and sound one.261 The Prime Minister’s acknowledgement 
that the system required more flexibility and that it would be seriously looked 
into by the Advisory Panel was seen as a very positive step and a sign that rather 
than being adversarial to dissent and protest, the state had instead realised the 
legitimacy of some of the concerns.  
This opinion was shared by CPF protestors interviewed. One 
interviewee shared that the “PM addressing it during the National day rally 
showed that it’s being looked into seriously” and that “it also showed how the 
government had managed to control the narrative and react to the protests very 
well.”262 Another experienced activist noted that  
The government responded well. They had a lot of focus groups 
talking about it. Some MPs also spoke to their residents about it 
in discussion sessions. I think the government has looked at 
changes. It’s still ongoing but its promising…The government 
took action and used it (the protest) as a listening platform and 
started their own conversation with focus groups and their 
grassroots. They took over the conversation!263  
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The Leviathan’s calibrated strategy with regards to the CPF protests was 
nuanced, utilizing a range of options available on the spectrum of control. 
Although state strategy began coercively with a defamation suit against Roy 
Ngerng, the realisation that the libel suit and the CPF issue had resulted in a 
huge groundswell of popular support for his position meant that the state then 
changed tack in favour of liberalisation and co-optative strategies. The state 
allowed for an active conversation in the public sphere, contributing to but never 
controlling the conversation online. It also did not make any attempt to stifle the 
protest movement in Hong Lim Park.  
The decision to pursue a strategy of calibrated liberalisation in this 
instance is especially significant. In Chapter 3, we had noted that the Leviathan 
would liberalise according to how much of a threat it perceived the issue or key 
personnel involved would be. In this instance, the state did not decide against a 
strategy of calibrated liberalisation, despite the presence of opposition 
politicians or the fact that the CPF as a core socio-economic policy was a highly 
sensitive issue for the Leviathan.  
Instead the Leviathan actively pursued a strategy of co-optation. The use 
of extensive grassroots organisations and the offer of access to key political 
decision makers co-opted the conversation and in doing so, set its boundaries 
and shaped the potential for change. Through dialogue sessions with PAP 
leaders, focus group sessions with the CPF advisory panel set up by the state, 
and feedback sessions with grassroots leaders, the Leviathan offered an 
alternative means of evoking change, albeit under its careful gaze.  
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The success of the PAP’s carefully calibrated strategy was evident over 
the next few months. Subsequent protests attracted protestors only numbering 
in the hundreds, a significant dip from the large crowds of 7 June.264 One 
interviewee who attended the 7 June rally, but did not attend subsequent 
protests, suggested that:  
There seemed no reason to go Hong Lim and scold the 
government when it was obvious they were interested in 
listening and changing things. If they don’t listen we scold, they 
listen also we scold, the protests will end up losing effect. We 
must be willing to say that they are doing a good job when they 
admit things need to change and they are trying to change.265 
6.3 ‘Heckle-gate’ and a Realisation that the Sword Swings Both Ways 
The state’s strategy of stepping back and co-opting the conversation also paid 
unexpected dividends due to the unfortunate sequence of events on 27 Sept 2014 
during a planned protest rally called “Return our CPF” which attracted a few 
hundred protestors. Once again led by Han Hui Hui and Roy Ngerng, protesters 
marched around the park. Hearing that then-Minister of State (Trade and 
Industry) Teo Ser Luck was in attendance as the guest of honour at a charity 
carnival called Proms@the Park organised by voluntary welfare organisation 
YMCA, Hui Hui and Ngerng chose to make their presence felt.266 The Straits 
Times described the events that followed:  
Waving Singapore flags, they (the protestors) stopped near the 
stage, in front of which sat rows of elderly guests, and shouted 
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chants, including "Return Our CPF" and "Vote Them Out, PAP.” 
These chants were apparently directed at Mr Teo, who was 
speaking to the audience of seated senior citizens. Jeering was 
also heard. At the same time, a group of special needs children, 
the Y Stars, had taken to the stage for their dance item. Several 
children, shocked by the rowdiness, missed a beat. The 
performance had to be restarted.267 
The public backlash was deafening. The protestors, particularly Ngerng 
and Hui Hui, came under heavy criticism for their rowdy behaviour, particularly 
for heckling special needs children and senior citizens. PAP leaders were 
particularly stern in their rebukes with Minister Tan Chuan Jin referring to their 
behaviour as “…vile (and a) total and absolute disgrace.”268 The protestors also 
came under harsh criticism from opposition politicians, public intellectuals and 
noted bloggers, many of whom had previously been supportive of Ngerng and 
the first protest rally.  
For example, Devadas Krishnadas referred to the protest leaders’ actions 
as “anarchic…visceral and vicious” and accused them of “self-indulgence, 
social carelessness, and “immaturity.”269 Bertha Henson, a noted former 
journalist and popular socio-political blogger, chastised Han Hui Hui for her 
“antics” and described her actions as “disrespectful” towards attendees of the 
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YMCA event. She referred to the actions of the protestors as an “absolute 
farce!”270  
There was also a groundswell of anger towards the protestors within the 
public sphere, with many taking to social media to make their opinions known. 
Police reports were made against the actions of the protestors which led to six 
protestors, including Han Hui Hui and Roy Ngerng being charged with 
committing acts of “public nuisance.”271 Han Hui Hui and Ngerng were 
“additionally charged with allegedly organising a demonstration without 
approval.”272 This time, however, there was no outpouring of public sympathy 
or accusations of persecution. An experienced activist who had organised 
several protests reflected on the CPF saga:  
To me, it is something that is one step forward, two steps back. 
The arrests scared off protestors and attendance kept dropping 
after that. People lost faith a little I think. Even myself, to 
organize events. We’re now putting off quite a few events…We 
were happy the CPF protests took off. What we are not happy 
with is they were too vigorous and too contentious and not too 
law abiding. That’s how they got into trouble. We weren’t 
comfortable with their actions…We have some events where 
there’s another group doing their own stuff and there must be 
mutual respect… I think a bit of wisdom and following the law 
is needed…To me, their actions actually derailed the movement. 
A lot of us are not comfortable now to organize any 
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protests…We don’t want to end up like them or that people 
aren’t coming.273 
The actions of Ngerng, Han, and the backlash they received, 
inadvertently revealed a key lesson for would-be protestors. Singaporean 
society remains conservative and expects protestors to conduct themselves in a 
socially responsible manner. Furthermore, social media and the public sphere is 
a medium through which criticisms can enjoy a multiplier effect. This potential 
can be exploited by the Leviathan as well as by its opponents when protestors 
and dissenters choose to function in a social irresponsible way. Furthermore, 
activists and public intellectuals are very protective of the public sphere they 
have managed to carve for themselves. Any action by fellow activists deemed 
damaging to its existence, either by the state or by public opinion, will be met 
with harsh criticism.  
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The Leviathan’s strategy with regards to the CPF protests best represents the 
range of calibration available to it on the spectrum of control. The state first 
employed a coercive strategy against Ngerng, a strategy it deemed necessary 
because of Ngerng’s decision to make personal accusations against the integrity 
of a key political leader within the Leviathan. This was a red flag issue which 
our model predicts would invite a strong response from the Leviathan.  But 
having noted the resultant groundswell of sympathy for Ngerng and discontent 
with the CPF, the Leviathan then responded with a nuanced, calibrated policy 
that involved the liberalisation of the public sphere and a careful co-optation of 
the conversation through its grassroots networks with the incentive of enacting 
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real change. The Leviathan’s strategy can thus be seen to be one of a careful 
calibration of coercion, co-optation and liberalisation. In conclusion it may be 
noted that the strategy in the case of the CPF can thus be represented as follows: 
 
































This dissertation has explored the varied and seemingly contradictory strategies 
of control employed by the Leviathan in Singapore. It has focused on the protest 
movements that have mushroomed in Singapore since the 2011 elections to 
study how the state’s strategies of control are evolving. I have argued that the 
Leviathan employs varied strategies of control in tandem, in a calibrated 
fashion, to maximise political control at minimal cost. In my analysis of three 
protest movements, I have contended that in response to each movement, the 
state has employed differently calibrated strategies.  
7.1 Summary of Main Arguments  
This dissertation has made some key contributions to the current literature. 
Firstly, it has argued that any attempt to understand the strategies of control 
employed by the state in Singapore needs to account for the way in which the 
state liberalises in a strategic fashion. This study has hence introduced a new 
strategy of state control, namely, ‘calibrated liberalisation’.  Secondly, this 
dissertation has also built upon the previous understanding of the term 
‘calibration’ by explaining that it refers to a combination of strategies. Lastly, it 
has conceptualised a new framework of analysis, the ‘spectrum of control,’ on 
which we can locate the various strategies used by the state.  
In chapter 4, the case of the NLB protests illustrated that the Leviathan 
adopted a strategy heavily dominated by a calibrated liberalisation approach, 
with very minimal use of coercive or co-optative strategies. The lack of red flag 
issues, and the lack of perceived threats, both in terms of key individuals and 
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the nature of the issue, meant that the NLB protest was a good candidate for a 
strategy of calibrated liberalisation. The case study was important in 
highlighting that a strategy of liberalisation, given the right conditions, could 
form the dominant element in a calibrated strategy of control.  
In Chapter 5, the case of the Thaipusam saga of 2015 demonstrated that 
the Leviathan employed coercion, tempered with muted use of liberalisation or 
co-optative strategies. The state used coercion in a nuanced fashion, making an 
example of three publicised dissenters and then using indirect threats to produce 
a ‘chilling effect’ on other protestors. The presence of the red flag issue of race 
and religion also meant that the Thaipusam protest was in many senses primed 
for a strategy dominated by calibrated coercion. 
In Chapter 6, the Leviathan’s strategy towards the CPF protests best 
represents the full range of options available to it on the spectrum of control. 
The state first employed a coercive strategy against an individual activist for 
making personal accusations against the integrity of the Prime Minister (a red 
flag issue). It then responded to the resultant groundswell of sympathy for the 
activist and general discontent with the CPF with a nuanced, calibrated strategy 
that involved the liberalisation of the public sphere and a careful co-optation of 
the conversation through its grassroots networks with the incentive of enacting 
real change. The Leviathan’s strategic toolbox involved a careful combination 
of coercion, co-optation, and liberalisation. 
7.2 Limitations of Research 
There are limitations and areas for improvement in this study. Firstly there is a 
question of universality that must be addressed. Given the strength of the 
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Leviathan in Singapore, it is worth considering if other regimes could employ 
the same level of sophistication and calibration when formulating strategies of 
control. It is also questionable whether the spectrum of control could be 
employed as a framework of analysis for other regimes. Yet there are some 
important conclusions that I believe are applicable for the study of other 
Leviathans and semi-authoritarian regimes. It is increasingly worth questioning 
how states that straddle democracy and authoritarianism liberalize as a strategy 
of control. While this dissertation was meant as a detailed study of the regime 
in Singapore, I do believe that the strategy of calibrated liberalisation is relevant 
to the study of other Leviathans and semi-authoritarian regimes.  
The second limitation lies in the theoretical framework of the spectrum 
of control. Given the limited scope of this dissertation, I have focused on 
establishing a theory of calibrated liberalisation and placed it within a wider 
framework of strategies that can be employed in tandem. I have not been able 
to further articulate and develop the spectrum of control as I would have liked. 
This dissertation has been able to establish that such a spectrum is indeed a 
viable way to comprehend thestrategies of control at work in Singapore and 
must remain satisfied with that.  
Lastly, this dissertation was limited by its ability to collect data. Given 
the perceived sensitivity of the case studies, gathering interviewees proved to 
be a daunting task. While in most instances, key organisers were willing 
participants, many participants proved to be extremely unwilling to be 
interviewed, even with assurances of anonymity. It sometimes took several 
sessions of online cajoling and the assurances from well-known activists before 
many were willing to even meet for an informal chat. Some, in the instance of 
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the CPF protests were still embroiled in court cases, and as such were unwilling 
to correspond. While this suggests strongly that a climate of fear and the culture 
of self-censorship and auto-regulation that the study has articulated still exists, 
it greatly limited the number of interviewees willing to participate.  
7.3 Avenues for Further Research 
There is greater scope to develop the spectrum of control as a theoretical 
framework. The spectrum of control, I believe, can be developed into a system 
that incorporates other strategies. It can also function as a means of articulating 
more clearly the level of calibration of the state’s strategy towards a particular 
issue. In future research I hope to focus exclusively on the spectrum of control. 
I also hope to reach out to stalwarts and promising researchers in the field like 
Cherian George and Walid J. Abdullah to collaborate on the establishment of 
this theoretical framework.  
Furthermore, much more research can be done on the notion of 
liberalisation as a strategy of control, and the theory of calibrated liberalisation. 
It can be extended to the study of the media, civil society organisations, religious 
institutions and organisations, as well as other areas to further our understanding 
of the strategy. It is also worth studying whether the feasibility of calibrated 
liberalisation as a strategy of control varies greatly amongst different sectors 
and areas. Again, I hope that other scholars will see this as an interesting avenue 
of study.  
As Singapore becomes more diverse in composition and more connected 
via technological leaps, a more vocal population will continue to demand more 
accountability and greater freedoms. Accommodating these calls for greater 
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space and liberalisation will increasingly govern the concerns of the Leviathan. 
Calibrating the degree of liberalisation it can allow will be an essential strategy 
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
 
NLB Protests 
1. Protest Organizer, Female, 27 October 2015  
2. Protest Participant, Female, 28 October 2015  
3. Protest Participant, Female, 29 October 2015 
4. Protest Participant, Female, 30 October 2015 
5. Protest Participant, Male, 31 October 2015 
Thaipusam Protests 
6. Online Protest Participant, Male, 23 October 2015  
7. Online Protest Participant, Male, 24 October 2015 
8. Online Protest Participant, Female, 25 October 2015  
9. Hong Lim Park Protest Organiser, Male, 27 October 2015 
10. Online Protest Organiser, Female, 27 October 2015 
11. Online Protest Organiser, Male, 31 October 2015 
12. HEB Feedback Activist, Female, 30 October 2015 
CPF Protests 
13. Protest Participant, Male, 23 October 2015 
14. Protest Participant, Female, 24 October 2015 
15. Source close to CPF protest organisers, Male, 27 October 2015 
16. Source close to CPF protest organisers, Male, 1 November 2015 
17. Source close to CPF protest organisers, Male, 3 November 2015  
 
 Due to the sensitive nature the research, most respondents desired to remain 
anonymous. Furthermore, my application to conduct the interviews was approved 
on condition of anonymity by the IRB board; a condition that convinced many 
interviewees to participate. 
 An organizer may be either the applicant and chief organiser or merely someone 
within a close cadre of personnel involved in the mobilization work required for 
protests to occur. I have desisted from providing too many details as the community 
of activists is a small one. 
 A source close to an organiser refers to someone with intimate knowledge of the 
planning and execution of the protest without actually being part of the planning 
itself. I have refrained from calling them participants, as they have much deeper 
knowledge than someone who merely turned up to protest. 
 
